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CHAPTER I  
 
Along the path of identity transformation of the different 
Albanian communities from their original Balkan environment 
to their destination in Italy as migrants 
 
      The Albanian Issues and Identities - Introduction 
In 1912, noting the weakness of the Ottoman empire, the Albanian 
intellectual elite declared the founding of the Albanian state. Using the language and 
culture as bounds, they made the first step in erasing substantial cultural and 
religious differences and the creation of common identity  between the Ghegs in 
Northern Albania and their Tosk cousins in the South. The newly founded state 
comprised, however, only a part of Albanian-inhabited lands while the rest was 
divided among the neighboring Slav states (Serbia and Montenegro) and Greece. A 
third of the Albanian population remained under the Serb and the Montenegrin 
administration, including the western coast of Lake Scutari, Kosovo and the western 
part of today’s Macedonia. Although this division had serious economic and 
psychological implications it was not the only reason for the Albanian discontent. In 
fact the Yugoslav state was from the beginning bitterly hostile to the ethnic 
Albanians. At first, the official state policy toward the “anti-national” and 
subversive Albanian element was one of the state sponsored assimilation through the 
Serbian education system. This policy, however, did not give the expected results 
and it was abandoned after it became clear that instead of aiding assimilation it was 
encouraging the growth of the Albanian national consciousness and oppositional 
activity.  
Considering that they were not able to assimilate them, the Serbian state 
authorities decided to adopt some more incisive policies of colonization and forced 
emigration. In the period between 1922 and 1938 many Albanian land ownerships 
were expropriated in favour of the Serbian and Montenegrin colonists and Albanians 
encouraged to emigrate to Albania and Turkey. Those who decided to stay in 
Yugoslavia were engaged in armed resistance and eventually sought to create their 
own national land.  
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In the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia the situation of the 
Albanian population improved. But, despite the efforts of  the Yugoslav authorities 
to overcome nationalist sentiments and to bring together Serbs, Croats, Slovenians, 
Macedonians, Bosnians, Albanians and other people of the new Yugoslavia into a 
state based on the socialist rhetoric of “Brotherhood and Unity”, it seems that the 
Albanians have never felt themselves as a part of the Yugoslav Federation. Although 
the Albanians were granted some political, cultural and educational rights (for 
example they had a right to elementary and secondary school education in 
Macedonia and all the way to university education in Kosovo and there were some 
Albanian newspapers and magazines, as well as radio stations and television 
programs). These rights from the Albanian perspective, however, were not enough 
to grant the equality of the Albanian community and to foster integration into the 
Yugoslav society. Despite the fact that the Albanians made up almost ten percent of 
former Yugoslav population and outnumbered Slovenes, Macedonians and 
Montenegrins they had never been recognized as a nation but as a nationality (ethic 
minority) without republican status. Such state policy was perceived as indicative of 
social exclusion and political oppression and had created a strong sense of 
community, woven around the idiom of suffering. In 1981, Kosovars rioted to 
protest their inferior status and demanded (for) the creation of the “Socialist republic 
of Kosovo”. The events in Kosovo were mirrored by similar, even if smaller scale 
nationalistic manifestations by Albanians in the Republic of Macedonia. The 
proposed “seventh republic”, which was to include the Albanian-inhabited areas of 
western Macedonia, was seen as a serious threat to the territorial integrity and as an 
answer to the Albanian nationalist claims, Macedonian and Serbian authorities 
introduced some special measures which circumscribed considerably the rights of 
the Albanian community and led to a gradual removal of Kosovo’s autonomy.  
 
With the collapse of the communist ideology and consequent dissolution of 
the Yugoslav federation, the political and economic situation changed radically. The 
creation of the new Macedonian and Serbian nation states, characterized by a fierce 
nationalism, brought about further fragmentation of the Albanian community. 
However, the collapse of communism and the dissolution of Yugoslavia had its 
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positive political implications on numerous Albanian communities in the Balkans. 
After decades of neglect, demands for greater cultural rights and political aspirations 
of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia gained prominence on the international 
scene. In 1999, the international military intervention put an end on the armed 
conflict between KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) and the Serbian regular and 
paramilitary troops. This was the first step on the long path toward the independence 
and international recognition that occurred in 2007.  In 2001, the long lasting ethnic 
tensions between Albanians and Macedonians reached its peak and erupted in the 
armed conflict that lasted several months. In August of the same year, under 
international pressure, the Republic of Macedonia signed the Ohrid Framework 
Agreement that provided for a series of political and constitutional changes designed 
to accommodate the demands of Albanian minority for equal standing and 
representation. Although the Ohrid Agreement has not answered all of the Albanian 
expectations, it together with the success in Kosovo did change significantly self-
perception of both communities. While in the former Yugoslav Federation they were 
an easily manageable minority facing a powerful state in the new political 
surroundings they form compact self-sustainable communities with a great potential 
for ethno-political mobilization.   
The Albanian communities in the Balkans are heavily concentrated in the in 
the north-west and southwestern parts of Macedonia, in the south-east of 
Montenegro and in Kosovo and Southern Serbia live more then 1.5 million of 
Albanians. This “ethnic continuity”, close economic and family ties with Albanians 
from Albania, that lives just across the border, together with the fact that the 
Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia had never lost their sense of shared national 
consciousness according to many politicians but also ordinary people, foment their 
dreams about Albanian national reunification.  
 
 In 2005, I already carried out a research on identity formation, political 
aspirations and particular features of Albanian nationalism among Albanians in 
Kosovo and the Republic of Macedonia. Using a technique of semi-structured 
interviews supported by a selection of photographs and images showing symbols, 
social practices and important events from different phases of the community 
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existence, I dug into people’s personal feelings, expectations, experiences and 
memories. This gave me the opportunity to learn about people’s perception about 
past and present and to gain a deep insight into the complex process of identity 
formation that includes a personal level as well. Five years later I decided to further 
my knowledge on the Albanian community and to include the most important 
component of the Albanian national identity, Albanians from Albania.   
 
 In 1989, after almost five decades of probably most the ruthless communist 
dictatorship in Europe, the “wind of change” reached the Albanian mountains as 
well. Europe’s most backward country slowly and painfully sliped out of its foreign 
political isolation and stepped on the road to democratic reforms, creating a market 
economy and building a new civil society in a multiparty system. The changes in all 
spheres of public, political and economic life were radical but, unfortunately, not 
always positive. After almost five decades of repression a long envisioned freedom 
had arrived. Albanians were free to vote, they had the right to passports and travel 
abroad, now all guaranteed by law. But after a short period of initial enthusiasm 
Albanian citizens had learned quickly that traveling abroad was not so simple 
because almost all European countries introduced a visa system. Foreign 
investments were not incisive as they hoped and didn’t prevent the closing down of 
the unprofitable  and outdated enterprises. Inflation and unemployment increased 
and significantly lowered the already poor living standard. So much so, that in the 
first years of transition the Albanian citizens experienced the shortage of food and 
even the most ordinary medicines. Political life was characterized by instability, 
internal struggles and corruption, that led the country  almost to the brink of civil 
war in 1997. Along with problems caused by the political and economic transition, 
the Albanian citizens had experienced a deep internal identity crisis as well.  
In order to achieve full control over the whole population of Albania, which 
had proved throughout its history to be quite unruly and disobedient, Enver Hohxa 
during his government, tried to eliminate significant cultural, linguistic and religious 
differences between Ghegs and Tosks and to foster the sense of common belonging. 
This was achieved through erasing their collective memories and traditions, the final 
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standardization of language and introduction of new narratives and national myths1 
that led to their complete isolation and subjugation to the communist ideological 
stereotypes and clichés. In order to  describe the brutality of the Albanian 
Communist regime and the difficulties that Albanians went through  in the period 
between 1945 and 1989, I’ll mention just few measures introduced by the 
Communist regime. In 1967, the religion was banned by law, the chiefs of the clans 
who were supposed to keep the customs and collective memories for future 
generations were imprisoned or killed, the hundreds of thousands of pillboxes were 
constructed, people were put to prison for just watching foreign television, etc. The 
result of such policies was that with the end of communist regime and Enver 
Hoxha’s legacy many Albanian’s self-images were shattered while leaving no 
alternative unifying national vision or what it really mean to be Albanian. .  
  In the period of economic hardship, political instability and general 
insecurity, nationalism, patriotic feelings and dreams of power that follow all forms 
of national assertion can in fact seduce a population that is coming out of a period of 
state and national disintegration. In such circumstances it could be reassuring to look 
outside the state borders, and this is exactly what happened in Albania. 
 “We are not a state of thee million people but a nation of seven million” is 
an often quoted Enver Hoxha’s statement from the early 80s. But, even if the 
nationalism was an underlying prop for the communist regime and one of the 
reasons why a regime of such brutality and eccentricity had survived for so long, the 
so-called “national issue” remained a task of secondary importance in the period 
between 1945 and Enver Hoxha’s death in 1985. Although the Albanian leadership 
often used the situation in Kosovo in order to appease domestic discontent it had 
never been their intention to include Kosovo within Albania’s border Rather, it 
could be stated that the Kosovo and its inhabitants were considered as a possible 
destabilizing element and threat to Hoxhaism. In fact, whenever the members of 
illegal Kosovar groups sought shelter in Albania, they were regularly handed 
straight back to the Yugoslav authorities.  
                                                
1 The myths had a very important role in the process of Albanian ethnogenesis, These myths initially 
introduced in order to eradicate internal differences and to ensure the stability of the communist 
regime were furthermore developed and exported in Kosovo and Macedonia. The nature of these 
myths will be discussed in the next chapters.  
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After Yugoslavia had fallen apart in was widely believed in Kosovo and 
Macedonia that a democratic government, led by the Democratic Party and Sali 
Berisha, would reverse previous negative trend regarding “national issue” and 
somehow encourage the international community to redefine the “unjust” borders2. 
However, once again Tirana’s official answer did not meet political expectations of 
numerous Albanian Diaspora communities in the Balkans.  Despite the fact that 
some extreme political leaders had called for political reunification with the 
“brothers” in Kosovo and that the problem of Kosovars had started to be openly 
debated in media and political institutions, the only commitment demonstrated by 
the Albanian state was rhetorical and sometimes even theatrical.  
As far as the ordinary people were concerned, when the Berlin Wall fell 
different Albanian communities eventually got an opportunity to meet and gain an 
intimate knowledge of each other. What they found out however was that their 
perception about their compatriots, who live just across the border, were romantic 
and unrealistic. It was recognized, although unwillingly, that there were enormous 
issues, apart from frontiers, still dividing the Albanian nation. After decades of 
separation and living in completely different social and political systems, they had 
become too different in terms of education, religion, culture and mentality. What 
binds them together are only language, kinship ties and ethnic memory. These 
symbolic resources are important but, I argue, insufficient elements to create a 
nation. However if    the aspirations about political reunification are premature and 
unrealistic, as many of my informants pointed out the “process of  spiritual 
reunification has already begun and it cannot be stopped”. The problem of the 
maturity and consolidation of the Albanian national identity is yet to happen in the 
Balkan region and the outcome of that process is quite uncertain. Moreover it 
shouldn’t be forgotten that at present we cannot speak of a single Albanian 
nationalism, but of at least two Albanian nationalisms with distinct centers and 
agendas, namely Prishtina and Tirana. While Tirana’ s nationalism is rhetorical and 
limited and I would say more a dream of power than a real political engagement, 
Prishtina’s, on the contrary is very concrete and aggressive and exercises a great 
                                                
2 Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia have never forgetten that after the First World War important 
parts of so-called “Natural Albania”  such as the Diber region were given to Serbia by the victorious 
powers as reward for its loyalty. 
 7 
influence on Albanian communities both in Macedonia and Montenegro. Notably 
there is a further problem to be considered i.e Kosovo only gained independence 
very recently and in the former state they were not sufficiently represented in the 
various public institutions. Consequently they lack competence in democratic 
tradition, diplomacy and the art of governance. Furthermore they will have to deal 
with the building of the state and the recognition of their state’s separate national 
identity.  
The main goal of this research is to discover how the different Albanian 
communities from Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia relate to each other, how they 
construct their identities in relation or in opposition to each other and to official state 
policies in their home countries.   
This time, however, I’ve decided to carry out the research here in Italy. Far 
away from their natural, highly politicized Balkan environment, where the sense of 
national belonging is considered not only as an indivisible part of the people’s 
identity but it also has a privileged status of being morally obligatory, I’ll be able to 
interview, observe and discover how the various Albanian communities relate to 
each other in a “neutral” foreign territory as well as their behavior regarding the 
delicate problem of their integration into the local community.  
For the sample I choose families with two generations who have experienced 
several dramatic socio-political changes during the lifetime of their middle age 
citizens. The middle aged Kosovars, for example, have experienced life in the 
Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, the Rump Yugoslavia (Former Serbian 
– Montenegrin Federation), difficult years that preceded independence of Kosovo 
and now in Italy. More or less Albanians from Macedonia have experienced the 
same shifts and changes in their public allegiance while Albanians from Albania 
have experienced life in “only” two states and have a completely different socio-
political background. On the other hand the members of the younger generation 
have usually experienced rather a short period of life in respective homelands. The 
most important years of their formation happened abroad and relatively free of the 
burden of the Balkan history they told me different stories about their own 
communities and how they perceive the others.   
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Such sample and their personal experiences give me the opportunity to gain a 
deep insight into three communities and to follow differences in their identity 
formation in the past and present but also to compare differences in the process of 
identity construction of people of different gender, age and education.  
But before I move to the analysis of specific problems and characteristics of 
Albanian nationalism and national identity formation it would be useful to answer a 
few questions and define some terms that in literature result quite confusing. For 
example what is nationalism and why this phenomenon aroused from the ashes in 
the last three decades? Are the nation and ethnic group synonymous for the same 
concept or do they have different meanings? What’s the difference between a nation 
and a state? And, in the end, why the did study of collective identities became so 
important in the last few decades? 
 
Revival of Nationalism  
The process of globalization, improvement in mass communication, 
democratization and the creation of new supranational organizations (like European 
Union) led to the creation of new, open and multiple identities that hardly can be 
captured by any single state structure. Yet, these changes didn’t eradicate the sense 
of national belonging. On the contrary, recent events in the Eastern but also in 
Western Europe showed that the sense of national belonging didn’t lost its intensity 
and is still a major force and a cause of conflict in contemporary Europe. From the 
Atlantic coast to the Ural Mountains different national minorities ask for the 
political identity and, fortunately less often, for national self-determination. This 
clearly indicate that in  contemporary Europe  the “national questions” are far from 
being solved.  
Various explanations were given in order to explain this phenomenon. The 
most acceptable one could be probably found in the very nature of the nation state 
which is characteristic for almost all European countries. Although culturally and 
ethnically heterogeneous, almost all European states have traditionally attempted to 
create cohesive societies on the principle of unique national culture. In this process, 
groups and individuals who differ from the dominant national culture are inevitably 
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left on the margins of society. At one level, these people will be assimilated, while at 
another they will be rejected and excluded.  
Some national minorities may seek to escape the minority status and claim to 
be accepted as full participants in the life of the nation state. They do so, in order to 
combat social and economic inequality, to gain access to resources and improve 
their status vis-à-vis the majority. However, in doing so, they must forget their 
history and culture and therefore they will be gradually assimilated and incorporated 
into a dominant culture. In other words, in this way, the members of a minority 
choose to change their identity.  
Such voluntary assimilations are rare and it is more likely that national 
minorities choose to resist assimilation attempts and to retain their identity. Some 
national minorities accept the minority status for their group and participate in the 
mainstream society, while others, that are politically organized and self-
consciousness emphasize their distinct ethnic/national identity and seek to establish 
political movements on national ground. This new situation almost inevitably leads 
to reinforcement of the degree of struggle between the minority and the state. The 
ultimate outcome of such a struggle depends on various factors: the structural 
characteristics of the national minority like its size and compactness3; the quality of 
the leadership and financial resources of the national movements; the possible 
existence of an external “homeland” that seeks to protect the minority from 
assimilation because there is a sense of shared nationhood across political borders; 
as well as policies pursued by the state itself. Accommodation of cultural, economic 
and political rights, increases the possibility that the minority group should seek less 
extreme solution of political and cultural autonomy within the borders of a larger 
political unit. Otherwise, if the state creates an image  (real or perceived)4 of an 
“oppressive” and “alien ruled” state that is attempting to homogenize the country 
and eradicate other cultural, ethnic and national identities, it is more likely that the 
majority group should advance more extreme claims of political independence. 
                                                
3  Some scholars argue that the larger minority group is relative to the state population, the greater is 
their capacity to alter the existing state framework. In addition, highly concentrated groups may constitute 
sufficient social and economic regions that under certain conditions may claim political independence. However, 
it has been widely accepted that these structural characteristics constitute necessary but insufficient condition to 
the advancement of particular types of group goals.    
4  Brubaker argues that the question of perception is important. National states do not necessary have to 
adopt politics of national homogenization, nevertheless the rhetoric emanating from the mobilized external 
homeland may be perceived as such by national minorities (Brubaker, 1994). 
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Many scholars argue that major cause of, what A. Smith calls “ethnic revival” can 
be found in the contradiction between the widespread theoretical acceptance of the 
right to national self-government and refusal of the states to tolerate their own 
dismemberment. Other contributing factors can be found in the fall of the 
communist ideology, the improvement of mass communications and in the fact that 
in the 19th century the right to self-government was applied only to the “great 
nations” like France, Germany, Italy, Hungary and others, while small national 
groups were usually denied to exercise the right to self-determination. Recent 
events, however, reveals that there is no limit to how small the new nations can be.  
The Balkans have witnessed the struggle of diverse powers – in more distant 
epochs, the Ottomans and the nation states that came into being in the 19th and 20th 
century and in the last two decades between new nation states who declared their 
independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. This new political situation reshaped 
political geographies of the Western Balkans and the newly rearranged borders put 
under considerable stress once prevalent assumption of people’s stabile 
ethnic/national identities and cultures. 
 
Collective Identities: stabile or shifting? 
“I’m Albanian but I’m not sure who we exactly were in the 1920s and 1930s. 
I remember that that at home we used to speak the Albanian language but the 
language spoken by the majority of inhabitants here in Ohrid was Turkish. I do not 
remember well, but I believe that my father used to declare himself as Turk” 
(from an interview with a ninety-five old Albanian informant form south-western 
Macedonia) 
In order to explain the very nature of collective identities this statement can 
be a very light-hearted starting point. Regardless the assumption of supporters of the 
Primordialistic approach who tried to convince us that the nationality is a natural 
phenomenon, something that we posses in the same way as we posses weight, height 
or blood group, the evidence that emerged from my research shows that 
ethnic/national identities are open, multiple and context dependent.  
W. Pfaff (1993) in his polemic book shows how identity and the political 
loyalty were changing the focus in different places and different historical times. "In 
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the past there were local loyalties to place and clan or tribe, obligations to lord or 
landlord, dynastic or territorial wars, but primary loyalties were to religion, God or 
god-king, possibly to emperor, to a civilization as such. There was no nation. To be 
Chinese was to belong to a civilization which was presumed to be universal, or if not 
universal, to have only barbarians beyond it.... To be Mesopotamian or Roman was 
to belong to an inclusive empire of undetermined borders... Rome was not a nation; 
it was a city and empire both. To be European in the Middle Ages was, for the vast 
majority, to be a Christian, with obligations and rights with respect to a landholding 
hierarchy dependent, in theory at least, upon the Christian emperor, the Roman 
emperor's successor, and the pope God's vicar on earth.... 
In addition, the ethnic/national identity is only one of dimension in our 
identity field, which consists of a large variety of overlapping and sometimes 
competing identities. Which dimension of identity I’ll choose to put forward 
depends on the context – political, social and historical. I can feel exclusively as a 
women, inhabitant of a certain region or a member of a certain nation. If my country 
is threatened I can feel a strong solidarity and allegiance to a nation even if before 
that national identity  had not been important to my self understanding or in 
determining my actions. But in peaceful times each of us “moves in a determinate 
numbers of communities, some more inclusive than others, making different claims 
to our allegiance” (Sandel 1982). So, it depends on the context to which territory or 
to which community I’ll feel to be most attached to. These potentially competing 
claims for the attachment can under certain circumstances become the primary 
political attachment and the nationalist discourse feels very uncomfortable with this 
flexibility.  
From the above discussion there seems to be enough arguments to assert that 
the collective identities are multiple and context dependent. However, for analytical 
purposes it may be useful to distinguish between different categories of collective 
identities. In his book “The Construction of Nationhood” A. Hastings distinguishes 
three categories of collective identities. He states that “an ethnicity is a group of 
people with shared cultural identity and spoken language. It constitutes the mayor 
distinguishing element in all pre-national societies, but may survive as a strong 
subdivision with loyalty of its own within established nations” (Hastings, 1997). For 
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Hastings, a nation is a far more self-conscious community than an ethnicity. It may 
be formed from one or more ethnicities, claiming the right to political identity with 
the control of specific territory. Furthermore, the nation state identifies itself in 
terms of a specific nation and there is thus an identity of character between the state 
and the people.  
Guibernau, for instance, speaks about two basic identities and speaks of the 
nation as a cultural community and of the state as a political institution, arguing 
“that a clear distinction needs to be drawn between three main concepts: nation, state 
and nation state (Guibernau, 2004). 
From the above analysis, we can deduce there are al least three basic types of 
identity: ethnic, national and state identity. The ethnic identity seems to be the basic 
one. The nation, consequently, can consist of one or more ethnicities, and the state 
can consist of one or more nation.  
 
Ethnic Groups and Identities  
In literature, the definition of the term “ethnic group” is quite confusing. 
Ethnic groups are usually understood to be social groups that share common origin, 
history, language and culture.  A. Smith in his Ethnic Origins of Nations argues that 
the ethnic group is a “named human population with shared ancestry, myths, 
histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of 
solidarity.” In Smith’s opinion, many nations have originated in pre-existing ethnic 
groups, which were pre-modern forms of cultural collective identity. “Collective 
cultural identity refers not to a uniformity of elements over generation but to a sense 
of continuity on the part of successive generation of a given cultural unit of the 
population…” (Smith, 1991). In Smith‘s opinion, the most important criterion of 
ethnic identity is the sense of solidarity, but the common myth of descent also plays 
an important role. Eriksen, following Smith, points that “seeing oneself as culturally 
distinctive, collectively and individually, from other groups, and acting accordingly, 
is crucial for ethnic group to endure” (Eriksen, 2004). 
Other scholars have different accounts. W. Kymlicka’s definition of ethnicity 
does not agree with other scholars and social sciences conventions. He argues that 
the term “ethnic group” should be reserved only for indigenous communities in their 
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homeland context. Fridrik Barth, for example offers an alternative approach in 
which ethnic groups are defined as “category of ascription and identification”, that 
people use to classify themselves and others (Barth, 1969). Barth’s approach allows 
us to understand how the ethnic boundaries are defined and maintained even in 
situations where there are no “objective” cultural criteria distinguishing between the 
groups. 
In ethnic nationalism, the national identity is often perceived as “a reflection 
or awareness of possession of primordial or inherited characteristic, components of 
ethnicity such as language, customs, territorial affiliation and physical type”. 
(Greenfeld, 1992).  
 
The Nation and the National Identity  
 
The above discussion stresses that there are at least three types of collective 
identities and that ethnic group and nation are discrete concepts. However, there is 
no agreement among scholars about subjective and objective factors in the definition 
of a nation. Some scholars argue that ethnic categories are older than nations, while 
others state that nations are a more recent phenomenon, not more than two centuries 
old.  
According to Anderson and Gellner, nations are socially and culturally 
constructed through complex historical and political process. It is well known 
Anderson’s definition of the nation as “an imagined community” and the Gellner’s 
statement that “nationalism invents nations where they do not exist.” These theories 
imply that the nations are created anew from absolutely nothing and do not take into 
consideration that many regional, ethnic, religious and class identities existed much 
before the rise of nationalism.  
A. Smith argues that if nations were a totally new phenomenon, if national 
traditions were completely unrelated with the past, than they would not exert such 
power over people’s lives. Smith believes that many nations have originated in pre-
existing ethnic groups and can be defined as “a named human population sharing a 
historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a 
common economy and common legal right and duties for all members. Weber as 
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well affiliates nations to pre-existing ethnic communities, but in his opinion the 
nations are too various to be defined in terms any criterion, but he continues, “What 
distinguishes the nation is the commitment to political project” (Weber, 1994). Yet, 
the ethnic group with its symbolic resources like history, culture and the myth of 
common descent constitute a necessary but insufficient basis for the emergence of a 
complete nation. They can be defined as “raw material”, and they need to be 
politicized in order to be transformed into nations. The nation, in Schoplin’s words, 
is above all political category. This does not mean that the nations do not have 
cultural, sociological, anthropological or other dimensions. On the contrary, he 
argues, “Without understanding the political dimension, too much is lost” (Schoplin, 
2003).  
Once politicized, ethnic group comes to define itself as a nation, and it may 
embark on a quest for self-determination by seeking some degree of autonomy or 
even outright sovereignty over a national homeland. The territoriality - or the 
existence of a homeland - is one of the most important characteristics of the nation. 
Hechter argues that the real or presumed homeland is properly regarded as a 
defining feature of the nation. “Nations are territorially concentrated ethnic groups” 
(Hechter, 2000). Another important characteristic of a nation and a national identity 
is the process of differentiation. “Our” group is conceived in a particular way. The 
real or perceived characteristics of a national group provide a sense of internal 
affinity and external difference. “If and when these differences from “others” are 
expressed territorially, then the ethnic group becomes a nation” (Billig, 1995). 
Other scholars list other important characteristics of nation like a belief in 
common heritage and destiny, existence of collective consciousness and cultural 
characteristics like key features that give substance to a nation and to a national 
identity. Speaking about nation, Hroh defines it “as a large social group integrated 
not by one but by a combination of several kind of objective relationships 
(economic, political, linguistic, cultural religious, geographical, historical), and their 
subjective reflection in collective consciousness” (Hroh, 1997). “I argue that 
national identity is a modern phenomenon of a fluid and dynamic nature, one by 
means of which a community sharing a particular set of characteristics is led to the 
subjective belief that its members are ancestrally related” (Guibernau, 2004). Some 
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authors claim that it is the belief in a common heritage and destiny which is decisive 
in the construction of a national identity. Other authors claim that cultural 
characteristics are the key features of a national identity. Still, there are a number of 
theories that treat the cultural characteristics of a nation as problematic. According 
to Kymlicka, we have no grounds for speaking of cultures as “synonymous” with 
nation or people. The cultural markers need to be politicized to serve as basis for 
claims of self-government.  
The ideology of nationalism connects culture and politics. It establishes 
cultural distinctiveness as a basis for political action. Culture and nation are discrete 
concepts, even if they are strongly related. “Because culture is complex and 
multifaceted, what matters for the content of national identity are not peoples 
objective cultural characteristics, but their subjective perception of these traits and 
how they compare to the traits of other populations” (Shulman, 1999) 
In spite of the similarities that exist between the concept of ethnic group and 
that of the nation, there are several important differences between the two that 
should be noted. These differences generally involve size, degree of politicization, 
and the relationship to a specific territory. Nations are large, politicized ethnic 
groups associated with specific territories over which they seek some degree of 
autonomy. Nations, as opposed to ethnic groups, are people who exercise, or hope 
one day to exercise, sovereignty over a given territory.  
 
The Nation-state and the Nation building process  
 
The distinction between a nation and a state is extremely important. While a 
nation claims to be a culturally homogeneous social group, a state is “a legal and 
political organization with a power to require obedience and loyalty from its 
citizens” (Seton-Watson); it is the mayor political subdivision of the globe. While 
states (like the former Yugoslavia) can contain more than one nation, there are 
nations (like in the Albanian case) who live in more than one state, and finally there 
are nations (like the Kurds, for example) who live in several states, none of which is 
their own. 
Nationalism is the political principle according to which “the political and 
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national unit should be congruent” (Gellner, 1983). In other words, nations should 
have the right of self-determination and the right to exist as a sovereign and 
independent state. Nationalist ideologies are based on the assumption concerning 
“the existence of a geographically, historically, and culturally unique nation, which 
“is believed to be born of and indissolubly linked to a bounded territory and 
particular history” (Handler, 1988). The goal of nationalist movements is to “turn 
ethnic group into that more abstract and politicized category, the nation; and then to 
establish the later as a sole criterion of statehood” (Smith, 1981). In other words, 
their goal is to create a territorially bounded political unit, a state, out of a 
homogeneous cultural unit, a nation. A state that emerges from a successful 
nationalist movement is known as a nation-state - a state whose political boundaries 
are the same as those of the nation, a state whose population is homogeneous; whose 
inhabitants are all members of the same nation5.  
Once established, the newly formed nation-state has to consolidate its 
national identity. One of the key elements of the national identity is the belief that all 
members of a given nation belong together, and in order to achieve this goal, the 
state has a variety of tools at its disposal. Anderson points out the decisive role 
played by the print-capitalism and the development of standardized national 
languages (both of which create a national community of people who read the same 
print language). Other scholars emphasize the importance of a new national culture, 
and the role that the intellectuals have in this process. They have a task to create “the 
symbolic capital” (Bourdieu, 1977) out of disciplines such as history, linguistics, 
literature and folklore, which than is disseminated to citizens through educational 
system. 
As far as the role of intellectuals in the nation-building process is concerned, 
A. Smith writes, “The intellectual is the interpreter, par excellence, of historical 
memories and ethnic myths. By tracing a distinguished pedigree for his nation, he 
also enhances the position of his circle and activity; he is no longer an ambiguous 
“marginal” on the fringes of society, but a leader of  the advanced column of the 
reawakened nation, the leaven in the movement of national regeneration”(Smith, 
                                                
5  Connor argues that only 12 of 132 states in the world “can justifiably be described as 
nation-states”. 
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1999).  
The intellectuals have to give decisive answers to decisive questions: what 
are the origins of the nation, who belongs to it and who does not. Among the 
intellectuals who propagate the national identity, historians have the particularly 
important function of constructing the nation’s past and present and presenting the 
nation as the inevitable outcome of a historical process. “The nations need a myth of 
descent, origin, ancestry, a golden age” (Smith, 1999). In other words, the nations 
need to believe in common ancestry, shared past and shared history that will unite 
people in a national community (Gellner), and the historians are invited to 
accommodate these claims. This is not an easy task considering that a new nation’s 
history must be written from complex and sometimes contradictory regional 
histories that had previously been told. 
The nations are created out of different local cultures, pre-existing cultural 
forms, dialects, written history and collective memories. The main task of the 
national ideologies is to reshape these elements and to create new identities and 
communities from them. The citizens of the newly created nation-state are expected 
to learn their national language, their national history and to accept their new 
narratives and national culture. In doing so, they must forget their local dialects and 
local histories. As they are to remember the battles they fought together against the 
nation’s enemies, they must forget the battles they fought against each other. And 
finally, as they try to remember, what binds them together, they must forget what 
separated them in the past (Danforth, 2002). However, the self-conscious and 
deliberate act, which aims to impose collective forgetting and acceptance of the new 
national narratives, is not unproblematic as national ideologists want us to believe. 
Bell argues that the introduction of official national narrative is an attempt to impose 
a definitive meaning of the past, on the nation and its history (Bell, 2003). He adds 
that there will always be a dissent and the story will never be accepted consistently 
and universally. This is the first problematic aspect of the nation formation process, 
because, contrary to the nationalist discourse, it seems that the nation is not a unitary 
entity, in which all members think, feel and act as one. “Instead, each of us engage 
in many different ways in making sense of nations and national identities in the 
course of our interactions with others and in making the ideas of the nation and 
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national identity accountable to us” (Thompson, 2001). 
From the discussion above, we may assume that, even if such thing as unitary 
culture and history do exist, it is very unlikely that all members of a nation (even of 
the same ethnic origin), within the state borders will share it. “Rather there will be a 
variety of cultural constructions from contestation between conflicting interests in 
the formation or development of the group” (Gilbert, 2000). 
 
Civic West and Ethnic East 
 Adam Smith points out that “though most later day nations are, in fact 
polyethnic many have been formed in the first place around a dominant ethnie of 
core, which annexed or attracted other ethnies or ethnic fragments into a state to 
which it gave name and cultural character” (Smith). In other words, even in cases in 
which the state precedes the nation, the state seeks to develop the cultural solidarity 
and the national unity within its population. However, the process of state building 
and creation of national identities was different in Western and Eastern Europe. 
Hans Kohn (1961) was the first to develop a systematic difference between the 
“Western” and “Eastern” nationalisms. The Western type is the result of a long 
evolution where the state preceded the creation of the nation. The social, economic 
and political conditions were created mainly through the state expansion and 
consolidation, to transform the “people” into “nation”. This transformation was 
based mainly on the liberal middle class concept enmeshed with its democratic ideas 
and ideals. The result is a “civic” form of nationalism based on the citizenship, 
subjective choice and democratic ideas of the national sovereignty. The main 
political goal was to redefine people as citizens and to create inclusive societies 
where “anyone can integrate into the common culture, regardless of race and color 
(Kumlycka, 1996). 
 On the other hand, the Eastern form was created in a completely different 
environment. The nations were not created out of existing states but against the 
existing state pattern. The idea was to redraw the existing state boundaries in 
accordance to ethnographic differences in extremely heterogeneous societies. The 
eastern nationalism is based on cultural identity and nationality as an “objective 
fact”. The people were not primarily citizens, but “the Volk”. Where Western 
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nationalism started as a political development the Eastern started as a cultural 
movement (Romanticism) that later changed into a political force. The empirical fact 
of non-existence of national identity, of its variability in space and time is 
interpreted by nationalists as the result of oppression and subjugation. The fact that 
many people did not express their national identity everywhere and in all historical 
periods with the same enthusiasm is the consequence of the simple fact that the 
foreign conquerors had successfully suppressed it. The role of the intelligentsia and 
of the romantic nationalists of the XIX century was to awake and discover the 
forgotten national identity that was sleeping in the deeply hidden parts of the human 
soul6. In the reality, it was not so much to discover the suppressed identity as to 
create and consolidate identities from the existing components. The Religion, the 
language, the historical memories and the political expedience were used to reshape 
the existing collective identities, to draw the boundaries towards the others and 
consequently and most importantly to establish the right of self-determination of the 
“people“.         
The civic identity is based on a well-defined territory, a community of laws 
and institutions, equal rights for the members of the nation and common values, 
traditions or sentiment that bind people together. In other words, the social unity is 
defined by the political boundaries. On the other hand, in the Eastern type the 
affinity and the primordial ties are what hold people together. The ethnic identity is 
based on the idea of a common descent and people are perceived as one folk with a 
fixed identity, unchangeable and rooted in the natural distinctions between groups of 
people.  The Primordial types of collective identity appear to be 'objective' and 
unquestionable; the boundaries cannot be moved, and crossing the boundaries seems 
to be extremely difficult" (Eisenstadt and Giesen 1995).  
 About this civic - ethnic dichotomy, other scholars said: “The myth of ethnic 
nation suggests that you have no choice at all in the making of your national 
identity: you are your cultural inheritance and nothing else. The myth of the civic 
nation, in contrast, suggests that your national identity is nothing but your choice….. 
(Yack, 1996). It seems that ethnicity is not chosen - not even a possible subject of 
                                                
6  The image of a dormant beauty awaken from sleep is common in nationalist ideologies (Anderson, 
1996) 
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choice. “It is this, crucially, which distinguishes ethnic from civic nationalism; for 
on the later, national identity is presumed either to be chosen or at least to be what it 
would be rational to chose. Brown referred to these two bases of national identity as 
Cultural (or ethno-cultural) Nationalism and Civic Nationalism. “Ethno-cultural 
nationalism depicts the nation as a community of ethno-cultural sameness, while 
civic nationalism depicts the nation as community of equal citizens” (Brown, 2002). 
 Of course the East-West distinction can be subjected to criticism because 
some nationalisms in the west are clearly expressing the elements that Kohn 
attributes to the eastern version and the other way around  some Eastern 
nationalisms are very “western” like in the Czech and the Hungarian case7. 
Regardless of the dubious character of the Kohen’s distinction, his civic-ethnic 
dichotomy can be used as a useful distinction in comparing national identities. It is 
much more useful to treat it as ideal types and not as examples of concretely existing 
cases. In every example there is a mixture of civic and ethnic identities and this is 
valid for Eastern Europe as well. Greenfeld in his Nationalism in Western and 
eastern Europe argues: “what does play a part, and especially in determining 
whether a particular nationalism will be defined as civic or ethnic, is the perception 
of a nation’s status relative to other nations, whether it is perceived as a part of west 
of not (Greenfeld, 1995). 
 
 
Theoretical Background for the Fieldwork 
 
Many disciplines of social sciences, from linguistic to politics and sociology, 
have considered the way in which national and cultural identities are forged and 
reproduced in time and space. Actually, we may say that the national and cultural 
identity have become something very fashionable to study and literature on this 
topic abounds. One of the main reasons to focus on collective identities is that they 
are in transition. Due to the social and political changes of modernity, people’s sense 
of belonging have in many cases become open, ambivalent, and yet put into 
question. And as Bendle points out “though the identity is vital and problematic in 
                                                
7   For more details see Kurzio’s (2002) critical assessment on Kohn’s typology. 
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modernity “it is still under theorized and incapable of bearing the analytical load that 
the contemporary situation require” (Bendle, 2000). 
Considering the different research approaches and the diversity in the area of 
identity studies, the question is where to start from. In the social sciences, the nature 
of collective identities has been considered by three different theoretical approaches: 
primordialistic, modernistic and ethno-symbolic (Ozkirimli, 2000).  
The Primordialistic approach is marked by the vision of the nation as a 
natural part of human behavior, as natural as speech and smell. According to 
theorists of this approach, the identity is considered naturally fixed within a person 
without possibility to change. Linnekin and Poyer argue that “cultural affiliations 
reflect blood ties and have a predetermined quality of inevitability” (Linnekin and 
Poyer, 1990). The idea is that cultural forms from which nations are formed are in 
fact “primordial” or “naturally given”, which is one of the nationalism’s most 
powerful and dangerous constructions. 
The Modernists are not homogeneous and there are many differences among 
them, but what unites them is their conviction that the nations are a phenomenon of 
modernity. The theorists of this approach assume that it was not the nations that 
created the states and nationalism, but it was the state structures and nationalism that 
formed the nations. Among the most renowned and quoted representatives of this 
approach are scholars like Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. 
For Gellner, nationalism is a marriage between culture and politics. In his 
view, “Nations as a natural, God-given way of classifying man, as an inherent 
though long-delayed political destiny, are a myth, nationalism, which sometimes 
takes preexisting cultures and turn them into nations and sometimes invents them, 
that is a reality” (Gellner, 1983) 
 For Benedict Anderson, ethnicity and nationalism are essentially artificial 
constructs, “capricious imagined communities that float out of the new formed of 
media that have spread with economic modernization. Anderson’s description of the 
nation as an “imagined community” has been widely quoted. It is imagined, he 
posits, “Because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of 
their fellow members, meet them or even hear of them, yet in minds of each lives an 
image of their community”. It is community, he continues because “regardless of the 
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actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always 
conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship” (Anderson 1996).  
 Finally, the third theoretical approach competing with the primordialism and 
the modernism is the ethno-symbolist approach. It is represented by scholars, like A. 
Smith and J. Hutchinson, who ignore the arguments of the modernists regarding the 
origins of the nations and in opposition to them focus their interest on the role of the 
old ethnic groups and ethnic bounds in building and forming modern nations. The 
Ethno-symbolist approach put emphasis on the subjective components of the 
national identity while simultaneously underlining the social bases of the collective 
cultural identities. For ethno-symbolists what gives nationalism its power are myths, 
symbols, traditions and memories. It is exactly studying these elements that we can 
learn much about division in social and cultural life of a community experiencing 
rapid social changes, and the difficulties it faces in trying to achieve social 
integration (Smith, 1999)  
 I do not share the position of the primordialist school and nationalist 
ideologies which consider nations and national identity as natural phenomena of 
great antiquity and natural outgrow of shared culture which is deeply rooted in 
history. Rather, nations are constructed from diversity of the ethnic groups, social 
classes and regional identities, which is often a self-consciousness and deliberate 
political action. Nations and national identity are to be understood as historically and 
socially constructed human products which use building material from history, from 
collective memory, from personal experiences and state institutions, and as such 
they are “continuously negotiated, revised and revitalized” (Nagel, 1994). 
 On the other hand, I do not share the positions of certain modernists, who 
argue that nations are invented and artificial constructions, created anew from 
absolutely nothing, since the choice made by nationalizing actors to found national 
culture and history is significantly restricted. As Brubaker points out “nationalist 
make their own history, but not entirely as they please; not with cultures of their 
own choosing, but with cultures directly encountered, given and transmitted from 
the past.”(Brubaker, 1994). 
If we assume that nations are human constructs, this does not mean that they 
are artificial. If they were such they would not exert such a power over people’s 
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lives. They may be in a manner “imagined”  or “invented“, but the sense of national 
belonging is real and it is a dominant form of political attachment in the modern 
world. For this reason, we must understand how the people perceive commonality, 
cohesion and continuity even if they do not know each other in person. This is quite 
a complex process, emanated from above in a form of ideological engineering and 
state propaganda, as well as from below in the form of popular enthusiasm and 
national sentiment. Some of the main strategies generally employed by the states 
are: “the construction and dissemination of a certain image of the “nation”; the 
creation and spread of a set of symbols and rituals charged with the mission of 
reinforcing a sense of community among citizens. However, “while it appears that it 
is the individual who has to fit in with nation, it is nevertheless evident that people 
make decisions about nations, on the basis of their knowledge of “national cultures”, 
and locate themselves and others accordingly” (Thompson, 2001).  
“Nations are dual phenomena constructed from above, but in order to be 
understood must be also analyzed from below, from the ordinary people’s view, 
which is exceedingly difficult to discover” (Gellner, 1983). 
 When people think about “identity” they have in mind things like language, 
ethnicity, and culture. But these symbolic resources, like everything that is 
historical, undergo constant transformation and identities are “far from being 
eternally fixed in some essentialized past, they are subject to continuous ”play” of 
history and power” (Hall, 1990). For this reason, we may assert that national identity 
is a provisional, hybrid, and ongoing form of identification which has to be 
continually produced and reproduced over time and across space, if it is to retain its 
cohesive force. Instead of thinking of national cultures as unified, which once 
established are fixed forever, we should think of them in continuous competition 
with other forms of identity. The unity of the nation seen from that perspective is 
constructed through the narrative of the nation, by which stories, images, symbols 
and rituals represent shared meanings of nationhood. 
 At times of major socio-political changes when the official narratives of the 
nation may undergo a radical re-writing or separating off, such discursive 
constructions of unity may come under considerable stress. The significance of this 
for Albanian communities that are target of my research should be obvious if we 
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consider the fundamental changes they had to undergo. For them the official 
narratives of the nation were written and re-written. Not just once but several times.  
 
Methodology for the fieldwork  
 
 From the above discussion there seems to be enough evidence to assert that 
the national identities are not as sound and unitary as nationalist ideologies sustain 
and that they are, in addition, multiple, hybrid and ongoing forms of identification 
which involve the individual level as well. 
 But how to approach and comprehend this phenomenon? Different research 
methods have been used in order to gain deep insight into the people’s complex, 
fragmented and sometimes contradictory process of identity formation. If we assume 
that collective identity is a relatively unified concept, shared by all who adhere to it, 
makes it feasible to construct questionnaires. Thinking about identity as stabile but 
not necessary conscious or context dependent but stabile under certain conditions, 
this still allows quantitative methods or, in case a mix of qualitative and quantitative 
research techniques.  
According to Hall, there is no essence of identity to be discovered; rather 
cultural identity is continually developing within the vectors of similarity and 
difference, of inclusiveness and exclusiveness. The points of difference around 
which cultural identities could form are interactive with the socio-political context, 
they are multiple and subject to change. If we think about identity as an ongoing 
construction, potentially full of contradictions, which people confirm and reconfirm 
during their life-time, than in Somers and Gibson opinion this can be done through 
analysis of people’s narratives (Somers and Gibson, 1994) According to their 
theory, the narrative approach uses “relationality” as an important analytic variable 
and focuses on the various and fluctuating socio-cultural relations that an individual 
upholds during different life episodes. In Somers and Gibson’s opinion the meanings 
of identities are embedded in the stories and relations that people themselves 
consider as essential. Empirically this means that the analysis of people narratives is 
a convenient way to gain deeper knowledge of the fragmented process of the 
identity creation. However, such experiences cannot be elicited by questionnaires 
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and opinion polls. They require a deeper understanding on how people construct and 
confirm their identities and experiences in a concrete cultural and social context. For 
this reason, I have decided that my research had to be strictly qualitative.  
 Regarding methodology, I used a technique of semi-structured interviews 
guided through open questions and answers. But, considering that people’s identities 
may be too complex, contradictory, context dependent and only partially open to 
self-inspection and self-description, the oral narratives of my interviewees were 
stimulated and partially structured by a selection of photographs and images 
showing  symbols, social practices, and important events from different phases in 
the community existence. 
The technique of interviewing people on the basis of historical and 
contemporary photographs is not new in sociological research. Photo-elicitation was 
conduced for the first time and classified as such in 1957 by John Collier (see 
Collier J and Collier M, 1986). Since then it has been widely used in anthropology 
and visual sociology. 
The main reason why I choose this technique for my research is that, be they 
historical or contemporary, when used as a basis for interviewing people, 
photographs can act as a powerful medium for triggering peoples personal feelings, 
experiences, memories and associated events and contexts, and for connecting past 
and present through interviewees and researcher interpretation of both (Cronin, 
1998)8. Photographs can be used to trigger interviewee’s reflections and personal 
narratives which locate their experience within historical, social and political 
context. 
Another important advantage of this technique is that in talking about events 
that the photographs represent, interviewees do not have to answer direct questions, 
rather photographs provide context of interviewee’s own choosing. In this way the 
interview becomes more informal, and averts the strangeness of the interview 
situation (Schwartz, 1989). Using photographs provides the interviewee with a task 
similar to the viewing of the family album and enables them to talk, without 
hesitation about their way of life and their experiences of changing realities. 
                                                
8  For more details about significance of photography as a memory trigger see: Cronin and 
Gale (1996)  
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Moreover, the photographs ask their own questions. On the one hand, this 
enables interviewee to give alternative and sometimes oppositional meanings to 
photographs, on the other hand it reduces the role of the researcher to a minimum. In 
fact, only toward the end of the interview I was asking more direct questions to 
ensure further set of data. 
  Bearing in mind that my interviewees belong to three different communities 
and two generations, I made a selection of photographs and some video material that 
included: historical people, symbols, social practices and events from past and 
present, for example: the World War Two, the interwar period, Enver Hohxa’s 
funeral, upheavals in Albania in 1996, war in Kosovo, war in Macedonia, 
declaration of Kosovo independence etc.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
          Albanian identity – history and ethnogenesis 
 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, the main object of this research is to investigate 
problems, reasons and possible further political and social consequences of the so-
called “Albanian question” in the contemporary Balkan and foreign environment. If 
we are still  trying to answer this delicate issue we can not forget or underestimate 
some historical aspects. In fact, the problem of the Albanian identity is not a recent 
one but it originated  way back in their history, and is not only, I argue, a 
consequence of foreign oppression and expansionistic policies of today’s Albanian 
neighbors, rather, I would argue, that the process of differentiation among Albanians 
had started in the ancient times as a result of foreign conquests, great historical 
events as well as particular geographical characteristics of the territory and specific 
social organization.  
Contemporary scholars have embraced as sufficiently convincing the thesis 
that the Albanians are most likely the descendants of  ancient  Illyrian tribes that 
settled in the Balkans before the arrival of Slavs in the 7th century. In the Roman 
times, the famous Greek astronomer and geographer, Ptolemy of Alexandria 
mentioned among different Illyrian tribes, the tribe of Albanoi (that probably means 
“people dressed in white”) and refer to them as a mass of free peasants and warlike 
people who in the more backward North succumbed to assimilation and gradually 
lost their Illyrian identity awareness, while in the Southern lowlands, the local 
population resisted the strong civilization pressure of the Roman Empire and, at 
least partially, preserved their identity. In the following centuries the territory of the 
present Albania went through some dramatic upheavals. The arrival of Avars and 
Slavs brought significant ethnic changes that were difficult to revise. Moreover the 
territory was for a long period an object of rivalry between Byzantium and the 
Bulgarian kingdom, but the event that had a major consequences on the Albanian 
historical and identity development was probably the official split between the 
Eastern Orthodox Church and the Catholic Church. When their spheres of interest 
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were fixed, the dividing line ran across today’s Albanian lands, granting the Roman 
Catholic Church authority over the northern territories while the Orthodox church 
preserved their dominance over the southern lowland.  Another serious obstacle for 
creation of a single Albanian identity was the geographical environment. In his book 
“The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II” F. 
Braudel points out that “the mountains are a world apart from civilization, which is 
an urban and lowland achievement. Their history is to have none, to remain almost 
on the fringe of the great waves of civilization, even the longest and most persistent. 
Civilizations may spread over great distances in the horizontal plane but are 
powerless to move vertically when faced with an obstacle of a few hundred meters” 
The inhabitants of the Albanian inhospitable and inaccessible mountainous 
areas were in the majority free peasants, engaged in stock-breeding who lived 
almost in complete isolation and poverty and had very little contacts with feudal 
lords and church authorities. The rare travelers and observers from the past reported 
that these highlanders seemed to be anarchists by nature, thinly distributed and 
widely dispersed. These factors were probably the main reason why the attempts 
made by different empires and rulers, through out their history, to impose 
administration and to establish the state all ended in failure.  
Society was organized in fises9 (clans) and vllaznijas10 (brotherhoods) and 
every fis and vllaznija had its own serious and rich ideological and value system that 
tolerated no influences or intrusions by alien elements. Typical of this system was 
collective liability that didn’t recognize the individual as a legal entity. In the case of 
a crime, for example in the case of a murder all members of the fis had equal 
responsibility for the wrong doing of on of its members. Considering the tribal 
system regarded the vendetta as morally obligatory tool of justice, all members of 
the accused fis or vllaznia  became automatically potential targets of revenge, and in 
order to save their lives, sometimes entire brotherhoods or families were forced to 
leave. The blood feud was probably an important, but not the only reason of mass 
migrations. The Albanian highlands were infertile and inhospitable and the 
                                                
9 The fis was the highest, most significant and numerous form of social organisation. It was 
constituted on basis of the belief in a common descent, a real or imaginary ancestor and ensuing real 
or imagined blood relation in the mail line. 
10 – Vllaznia was a kinship unit smaller than the fis, based on the same foundation but less numerous 
and with really blood related members 
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population lived in  extreme poverty, this together with their refusal to pay taxes and 
to maintain any kind of contacts with feudal lords were probably the main reasons of 
mass migrations toward today’s Greece, southern Italy. Kosovo and Macedonia. In 
fact, the ethnic Albanians who settled in Kosovo and Macedonia during the 17th 
century, were according to many scholars, part of these North Albanian highlanders.  
The social and economic situation in the Adriatic lowland was quite 
different. Society was organized in close-knit communities who hadn’t been 
involved in the blood feuds. They had their own nobility, the Orthodox church had a 
great influence and the efficient system of justice was introduced. As elsewhere in 
the Middle Ages, with development of crafts and guilds, the cities on the Adriatic 
coast became important trade centers and to a certain degree improved the life of its 
citizens. They hadn’t been just simple servants of the Byzantine Empire, but indeed 
enjoyed some political and civil rights, they were allowed to take part in the council 
of citizens and had considerable local autonomy.  
Due to the flourishing economy, disintegration of the Serbian Kingdom and 
relative political stability, some Albanian princes and feudal lords sought to become 
independent masters of their feudal estates. This inevitably gave rise to animosities 
and rivalries between Albanian nobility and led the region in a series of wars 
between clans. The result of these clashes was anarchy and antagonism that paved 
the way to the Ottoman invasion.  
 
The Ottoman invasion. Colonization and islamisation 
The establishment of the Ottoman power over Albanian territories began at 
the end of the 14th century. Although slow and difficult, the Ottoman invasion was 
unstoppable. After the defeat at Kosovo Polje, the Ottomans in Southern Albania 
gradually deprived the local feudal lords and princes of their possessions and 
established their military feudal order in their place while in the unruly Central and 
Northern territories they preferred not to impose complete political and military 
control and opted for the policy of vassalage. Yet, the softer policy in the above 
mentioned territories this did not prevent the break out of insurrections against the 
new rulers. In 1443 George Kastrioti, the greatest Albanian national hero and the 
pillar of the Albanian national identity, proclaimed the uprising against Ottomans 
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and restored the independent principality of Kruje. His example gave impetus to the 
liberation movement in Central and Northern Albania. Almost all princes rejected 
Ottoman rule and under George Kastrioti’s leadership the free principalities were 
reestablished. In 1444, in the Albanian city of Lezhe he called an assembly of the 
Albanian princes and leaders of free tribes from the high mountains and despite the 
strong historical discord among them Kastrioti successfully found a union which 
went down in history by the name of the Albanian League of Lezhe. George 
Kastrioti was elected its leader and in the following decades he conduced a series of 
successful military operations that led to the establishment of the independent 
Albanian territories.  
Yet, George Kastrioti, known also as Skanderbeg, is not remembered in 
history just for his military operations against Ottomans. For the Albanians, the 
League of Lezhe represented an attempt to form some sort of a unified Albanian 
state. In fact, the League was a federation of independent rulers who undertook the 
duty to follow a common foreign policy and to defend jointly their independence. Of 
course, this kind of commitment required a collective budget and each family was to 
contribute to the common funds of the League.  
However, the League was short-lived. The Kastrioti’s efforts to reduce to a 
minimum the destructive forces of clan particularism and to found some kind of a 
single centralized Albanian state ended in failure. Family interests prevailed over the 
that of the “state” and the League unity began to vacillate when some of the princes 
and clan leaders abandoned “the common cause”. However, despite the difficulties 
George Kastrioti resisted the Ottoman military attacks and preserved independence 
of territories until his death in 1468. After his death many feudal lords as well as 
large numbers of peasants emigrated abroad and the “common Albanian cause” 
remained buried under historical ashes for more than four and a half centuries.  
However, for the Ottomans George Kastrioti’s death did not resolve all their 
problems. Officially they reestablished military control over the Albanian territories 
but complete conquest implied also social transformation and religious conversion. 
As we will see in the following pages, unlike elsewhere in the Western Balkans this 
process in the Albanian case was very long and, it can be stated never really 
completed.  The process of colonization had started in 1432 and it cannot be said it 
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was successful. It consisted only of a small number of people, whose task was to 
assume management of some smaller administrative units. But the situation in 
Albania was complicated and dangerous and the authorities soon abandoned this 
project. Rather, they made an attempt to gain some loyalty from the local population 
through the process of islamisation. Some people, in order to maintain (keep) their 
feudal estates or to be promoted in the Ottoman military hierarchy adopted the new 
religion, others maintained their Christian faith. According to some historical 
sources, in the 15th century the overall ethnic and religious configuration in the 
Southern Albania preserved its pre-Ottoman characteristics.  
In the same period in Northern Albania the process of islamisation 
apparently seemed to be more successful. Many clans actually used to present 
themselves to the central authority as true Muslims. The closer analysis of historical 
sources indicates however that their conversion to Islam was, in most cases, 
fictitious11. In order to make their life easier, to pay less taxes, avoid foreign 
elements and gain all possible advantages from the central authorities they officially 
and publically professed Islam while in private they continued to observe Catholic 
rites. As Muslims, the chiefs of the villages were officially registered as spahis (that 
means that they were subject to military service to the empire) and as such they were 
granted land called timar. As spahis they were members of military class and as 
such, on the paper alone, under direct command of the central authorities. In reality 
these local chiefs defended only the interests of their own communities which 
tolerated no foreign presence of interference and at the same time maintained 
minimum but necessary contacts with official power (payment of taxes and the 
recruitment of soldiers for the Ottoman army).  
The central authority was quite aware that their Albanian “representatives” in 
the highlands were unreliable but it was the only way to establish, at least formally, 
Ottoman administration and to have minimum control over and contact with local 
population. For Albanians this system was acceptable allowing them to maintain 
their religion and customs, and to live relatively free, governed by their own 
                                                
11 Bishop Zmajevic pointed out that “ there is a vicious and disdainful custom to give Holy 
Communion to those who, in order to evade taxation, publicly profess Islam, and secretly the 
Christian fait, infecting other by their example.  
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traditional laws. In this way the Albanian population in the highlands imposed their 
own model of seeming submission and actual self-government.  
 
The Process of Islamisation 
 
In Albania the process of islamisation was not forced, since all attempts to 
impose the new faith on Christian inhabitants ended in failure. It was also very 
gradual. It started in the 15th century with the incorporation of the local aristocracy 
into the Ottoman military-feudal class. Like elsewhere in the Balkans the majority of 
pre-Ottoman feudal lords adopted Islam in order to keep or extend their estates or to 
prevail over their rivals. Some native non aristocratic people also adopted Islam 
especially in the urban areas but until the 17th century the majority of population 
remained Christian. In the following centuries this process became rather dynamic 
due to the political aspirations of the Ottoman empire but also thanks to folk 
mentality and the peculiar religious identity of the native inhabitants.  
As mentioned above some of these conversions were fictitious and proved to 
be an useful tool in maintaining a relative independence for some Albanian rural 
areas. Although only seemingly submitted to the central authority many families 
were obligated to provide soldiers for the Ottoman army. Although, according to 
some historical sources12, these Albanian soldiers never lost awareness of their 
ethnic or clan identity and their sense of affiliation to the Albanian North or South or 
to a particular village or local community  was strong; they, recruited for some elite 
troops as well as for the sultan’s guards, unavoidably they became committed to the 
Ottoman elite and gradually entered as an integral part of the official authority.  
Unlike the highlands where the Ottoman administration was only formally 
established, in the urban centers it was real. The cities were the first centers of the 
conquerors’ administration and the influence of Islam was strong. The numerous 
                                                
12 In the first decades of the 18th century Lady Mary Montagu visited Albania and left quite accurate 
description of its inhabitants. “Of all regions I have seen, the Arnaut seem to me most particular. 
They are natives of the Macedonia and though they have lost name of Macedonia they still retain 
something of the courage and hardiness. They are foot solders and considered the best militia in the 
Turkish empire. They are all clothed and armed on their own expense, dressed in clean white coarse 
cloth… these people living between Christians and Mohametans declare that they are utterly unable 
to judge which religion is best, but to be certain, but, to be certain of not entirely rejecting the truth, 
they follow both and go to the mosques on Fridays and to the church on Sundays. 
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conversions to the new religion were due also to the fact that being Muslim was 
much more convenient than being Christian. The Muslim merchants and holders of 
money capital often colonists gained strong positions in the urban centers and the 
role of Christians began to decline. The only way to maintain their position was to 
embrace the new religion.  
In the villages, the spread of Islam started much later. This was mainly due to 
the fact that the Ottomans did not have interest to impose Islam on a mass scale, 
considering such policy would have seriously affected the military and economic 
interests. The Christians were paying more taxes and were a source of recruitment 
for the Jannisary corps13. Along with this it should be also mentioned that the 
population in the rural areas lived in a traditional, close-knitt and quite isolated 
communities that made them almost impenetrable for any kind of foreign influence. 
In fact, as reported by the Vatican Catholic inspectors at the beginning of the 17th 
century, in Northern Albania and Kosovo only 10 percent of the Albanian speaking 
population embraced the new religion. 
However, starting from the midle of the17th century  the process of 
islamisation became more dynamic and incisive and included the highlands as well. 
As already mentioned above, many Albanian clans formally embraced Islam in 
order to ensure their survival as relatively free and self-governing communities and 
to allow their  admittance to the local Ottoman administration. Although officially 
Muslims, it wasn’t uncommon among these people to continue with old Christian 
practices that were strictly forbidden by the Sheriat Law. In fact, along with the 
prescriptions of the new religion many continued to baptize their children, took 
Holly Communion or to marry Christian women. This kind of dual religious identity 
was common among the Gegs in the North as well as among the Tosks in the South. 
Along with these explanations some scholars identified the reasons of a large scale 
conversion to Islam in the religious indifference that was already widely spread 
among Albanians in the pre-Ottoman period. This was mainly due to the strong 
rivalry between the Orthodox and the Catholic Church. The subordination of the 
                                                
13 The Janissaries (meaning in Turkish “new solder”) were infantry units that formed the Ottoman 
sultan’s household troops and bodyguards. The force was created by the Sultan Murad I from 
Christian boys levied through the devshirme system (in the Ottoman times feudal dues were paid by 
services to sultan)from conquered countriesin  in the 14th century and was abolished by Syltan 
Mahmud II in 1826.  
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population now to the Vatican now to the Patriarchate of Constantinople and their 
struggle for domination over population caused, according to some scholars, the 
ideological doubts that prevent formation of an integral Christian outlook. In this 
ideological gap, some Muslim religious sects whose rituals and rites were closer to 
folk belief played an important role in the adoption of Islam. Sects like dervishes 
were religiously tolerant in celebrating some Christian saints and their missionaries 
were successful in melting together local traditions with Islamic and Muslim beliefs 
and practices, making in this way the conversion to the new religion easier.  
What is more, in their long history, Albanians had learned that in difficult 
times they could not rely upon a concrete Church support. All these factors together 
contributed to the process of islamisation of the Albanian inhabited lands. Although 
some may argue that this was a very slow process, in many cases more a conscious 
strategic move than a sincere conversion and that the existence of a dual religious 
identity was quite a widespread phenomenon among Albanians the fact is that by the 
end of the 18th century, about 70 percent of the Albanian population was Muslim.  
 
The Rise of National and Patriotic Ideas 
  
Unlike its Balkan neighbors who during the 19th century all went through the 
process of national liberation and awakening, and established their own national 
states, the Albanians remained on the edges of these big social and political 
upheavals. This is quite surprising if we take into consideration that initially, the 
Albanians resisted the Ottoman invasion more vigorously than their neighbors and 
that in the first period of the Ottoman domination had rioted more often than 
anybody else in the region. In the second half of the 19th century the seed of the 
Albanian national identity sprouted but it was limited to some elite circles and 
completely missing among the folk. The absence of any politicized national 
consciousness was quite common among the Ottoman’s subjects in the Balkans and 
is the result of so-called millet system. In the Ottoman Empire the population was 
organized into communities or administrative units, known as millets, based on 
religion rather then on ethnicity or language. Muslims were recognized as equal first 
class citizens in the Muslim millet while the Christians and Jews were tolerated and 
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organized into separate millets. The different millets were treated as corporate 
bodies and had their own internal structure and hierarchy. Until the first half of the 
19th century all Orthodox Christians in the Balkans were members of Rum millet.  
As such they were controlled by the Greek patriarchate in Istanbul and all 
experienced an objective threat of Hellenization. With regards to the members of the 
Muslim millet, they all, regardless of their ethnicity tended to consider themselves as 
Ottomans. This policy deeply influenced the identity formation of the peoples in the 
Balkans and the final outcome was that after four centuries of Ottoman domination 
the faith and not language or ethnicity became the prime focus of identity outside the 
family and locality.  
The reasons of historical delay in affirming the existence of a separate 
national identity through the foundation of an independent national state could be 
explained with the fact that Albania was one of the most backward and isolated 
countries in the region. One of the rare travelers who visited Albania in the 19th and 
20th century, the French journalist M. Delasy wrote that he had never visited a 
country so closed to civilization. “Even the Sahara is better known to us” wrote 
Delasy in his Les Aspirations autonomies en Europe (1913). The isolation, however 
was not only external but internal as well. In the first place the country was divided 
into four administrative units, vilayets that were de facto autonomous and there were 
no organic connection and no communication between them14. To move from one 
vilayet to another the travelers required special safe conduct passes. There were no 
roads and from  the narratives of rare European visitors those that existed seem to be 
dangerous. Another major obstacle was the traditional distinction between Gegs and 
Tosks, that dates back to the pre-Ottoman period.15 So the Albanians lacked the 
single administrative cultural center and to make things even more complicated they 
had to face up with strong religious differences as well. 
Although they never lost their feeling for regional or clan affiliation , the 
Muslim majority also had a strong sense of affiliation to the Ottoman Empire. In 
                                                
14 The four Ottoman vilayets with substantial ethnic Albanian population were: Kosovo vilayet, 
Shkoder vilayet, Monastir and Ioannina vilayets.  
15 This distinction was both cultural and linguistic. The language was divided into two major dialect, 
the southern Tosk with strong Greek influence and northern Gheg dialect that borderd predominantly 
on Slavic languages. The boundary of the two dialects was marked by the river of Shkumbin. The 
ethnographic, cultural and linguistic differences between the North and the South were such, that we 
can speak about two distinctive autonomous regions – Gegeria and Toskeria 
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five centuries of Ottoman domination, Albanian Muslims became a part of the 
Ottoman elite. They were the integral part of official authorities and held high 
positions in the army but also at the Ottoman court. In addition (what is more) they 
were educated in the Turkish language and felt strong affiliation with the Ottoman- 
Turkish culture as well.  
 Albanian Orthodox Christians made up about 20 percent of the population 
and if learned, they studied in Greek and were and were educated in the spirit of 
pan- Hellenism. In Catholic school the official language of education was Latin and 
Italian and pupils received generally the pro-Western cultural imprinting. In such 
social environment it comes as no surprise that the ideas of national unity and 
emancipation among Albanians were almost completely missing.  
 Regardless all these difficulties and obstacles, the process of the Albanian 
National Awakening, better known as Rilindja had started in the first half of the 19th 
century. As elsewhere in the Balkans, where the state preceded the nation, Albanian 
nationalism began as an elite phenomenon and was limited to a handful of 
intellectuals living abroad. Inspired   with the ideas of European Enlightenment and 
influenced with the writings of some European travelers and ethnographers who 
visited Albania , the national ideologists made their first attempt to “awake the 
sleeping beauty” and create a seed of the Albanian national idea. The first 
programmed document of the Albanian national movement was written by Naum 
Vaqilharxhi, an Orthodox Albanian and was published in 1845. In it, Vaqilharxh 
emphasized the importance of the Albanian language and suggested that its 
development represents the first step in the evolution of the Albanian people. Of 
course, the Vaqilharxh example was not isolated and some other Albanian resistance 
movements also published their programs and called for national unification. Still, 
their policies did not have a great impact on Albanian society and its folk. 
 In the second half of the 19th century, due to great changes that occurred on 
European, as well as the regional, political and social scene, the Albanian national 
movement went through a period of great qualitative transformation. In 1878, after 
the peace treaty of Santo Stefano and a Turkish defeat in a Turkish – Russian war, 
the Great Powers called the Congress of Berlin. The goal of the congress was a 
partition of the Ottoman Empire between the newly created regional national-states. 
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Considering that,  according to many politicians, Otto Von Bismarck included, 
Albania was nothing else but a geographical expression, a number of territories 
inhabited by Albanians were annexed by Serbia, Greece and Montenegro. It was in 
this atmosphere of general political, social as well as territorial and identity 
insecurity that the League of Prizren was founded. The League was a political – 
military organization that united different Albanian committees (put under a single 
flag), regardless of their religious or regional affiliation into a single body and 
transformed the Albanian romantic national movement into a real political national 
movement. 
 The priority and the immediate goal of the League was to prevent partition of 
the Albanian inhabited lands from the aspirations of their neighbors and defense of 
the Albanians’ national interests. For this reason they called upon the Port to unite 
four vilayets into a unique administrative unit with well defined borders. Although 
important the demands for autonomy and territorial unity were not the only goals of 
the League. Similarly to other national movements, the Albanian National 
Movement elaborated the political platform in which they aimed to transform 
passive, illiterate mountaineers from the North, historically bounded to clans, Islam 
and Empire and the pro-western Southern Albanians into a single “organic”, 
culturally and linguistically homogeneous nation, with a codified official language 
and well defined territory.  
Initially, the Ottoman authorities were supportive of the Albanian national 
movement and the League members exported their ideas to the Albanians of the 
Kosovo and the Macedonian vilayet, including the use of Albanian as official 
language, autonomy for all Albanian populated provinces within the empire and the 
formation of an elected council of Albanians, that would represent the Ottoman state 
in Albanian territories.  
However, with precedents like Serbia and Greece before it, both of which 
seceded from the Empire, the central Ottoman administration was unwilling to 
accord another autonomous region, which eventually would become an independent 
state. In the 1881, the League of Prizren was banned and its leaders forced to flee 
abroad. Although the League eventually failed it constituted a turning point in the 
history of Albanians. With its foundation the Albanian romantic national movement 
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was transformed into a national ideology and political force (which eventually led to 
the creation, a few decades later, of an Albanian independent state). 
At the outset of the 20th century Haji Mula Zeka founded the first Albanian 
guerilla movement with a political motivation. The main aim of this so-called 
Albanian Revolutionary Committees was to organize a series of uprisings against 
the Ottoman authorities in different Albanian towns. In the first years of its activity, 
this Albanian national movement was allied with the Young Turk’s cause. But when 
it became obvious that the Young Turk’s revolution did not aim to contribute to the 
national causes of different national causes and that, on the contrary the real agenda 
of this organization was to promote Turkish nationalism  their collaboration ended. 
In response to the pan-Ottoman programme that implied control over the religious 
communities and national schools of non-Turkish people the Albanians formed their 
constitutional clubs and demanded for the foundation of single administrative unit 
for all Albanian inhabited lands and opening of Albanian schools. Although some 
Albanian feudals, committed to the Ottoman Empire tried to impose a line of 
compromise with the Porte, their policy was overwhelmed by the nationalistic trend 
which called for autonomy and sometimes even independence. In the period around 
1910-1911 the Albanian national movement reached its full maturity  and a number 
of armed insurrections arose in different Albanian inhabited territories starting from 
Kosovo. At the same time Albanians tried to defend their cause by legal 
parliamentary means as well and started a parliamentary debate about Albanian 
cultural and political rights. This joined military and political action gave some 
positive results. In fact, immediately before the outbreak of the Balkan Wars the 
Port allowed some kind of autonomy for Albanians within the framework of the 
Empire. But, with the Ottoman defeat in 1912 its government administration 
actually ceased to function and the fear of partition of Albanian inhabited territories 
between the countries of the Balkan Alliance arose. This new political situation 
convinced even the most fervent supporters of the Port that for Albanians there was 
no other solution than to embark on the path to independence.  
On 28 November 1912, when the armies of the Balkan Alliance had already 
occupied most of Albania and their governments officially stated that “Albania 
never existed and therefore it cannot be created”, 83 representatives form different 
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parts of Albania proclaimed in Vlora the secession from the Empire and the 
foundation of the independent state of Albania.  
The final outcome of this decision, strongly supported by the Great European 
Powers as well, was a state of 28.000 square kilometers which, far from the dreams 
of the founding fathers of Albanian nationalism, comprised only a part of the 
Albanian inhabited lands. The boundaries of the Albanian state were defined in 
London in 1913 where the representatives of the Great European Powers decided to 
resolve Albanian problem by applying the principle of the winner of the war16. On 
this principle, the  Albanian state was not recognized in its ethnic borders and a third 
of the Albanian population remained under the Serb, Greek and the Montenegrin 
administration17. This territorial partition was perceived as unjust by the Albanian 
part and in the years that followed became a constant source of tensions and 
confrontations between the states.  
Although this division had serious political and economic implications it was 
not the only reason of the Albanian discontent. In fact, with the independence from a 
province of the Ottoman Empire, Albania turned into a protectorate of Great Britain, 
Austria-Hungary, Italy and Germany. In fact, German prince Wilhem de Wied was 
appointed prince of Albania and enthroned in 1914, while the army, police, finances 
and other important institutions were all controlled by foreigners. In the period that 
followed the foundation of the state, the traditional, as well as some new internal 
problems and contradictions emerged. The Ottoman legacy was hard to erase and it 
was clearly visible in the model of state organization, administrative division and in 
the electoral and juridical system. The country remained essentially unintegrated, 
dominated by a class of politicians who had an interest in the maintenance of a 
socio-political status quo, inherited from the Ottomans, and was essentially feudal. 
Along with this Albania was overwhelmingly illiterate and almost ninety percent of 
the population lived in extreme poverty. Inadequate infrastructure, lack of transport 
facilities and communications continued to exist together with the substantial 
cultural, social and linguistic differences between Ghegs and Tosks. Albanian 
remained a divided country even after the proclamation of independence and  very 
                                                
16 The Albanians were allies of defeated Ottomans in the Balkan Wars. 
17 Kosovo and Metohija were annexed by the Serbian Kingdom, the western coast of lake Scutari by 
Montenegrins while the region of Cameria was given to Greece.  
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few people identified themselves primarily as national Albanians. In other words the 
problems and obstacles that became apparent in 1878 were still there. Although 
probably premature, and as some argue, more a result of external events than 
consciously aspired, the statehood was achieved. After the First World War 
Albanian leaders began a process of nation and state building. In the interwar period 
the most important issue for the majority of Albanian political leaders was to ensure 
Albania’s survival as an independent state and to find its place in the Balkan 
environment. This was not easy an task considering that the newly founded state was 
weak, without real allies and surrounded by powerful neighbors who all had 
territorial claims.  
Considering the above described internal and international political situation 
it is not surprising that, in the period between 1918 and 1939, Albanian political 
leaders opted for policies aimed to consolidate state institutions, increase the internal 
social and cultural cohesion and to maintain the status quo on the international 
scene. On their political agenda there was simply no room for the so-called 
“National question”. Strong desire for national unification of all Albanians existed 
among Kosovars and inhabitants of Northern Albania but their aspirations had never 
met any serious state support18.  
In the spring of 1939 Italy occupied Albania, annexed its territories under the 
Italian crown and Mussolini’s government assumed all functions of the Albanian 
state. Italians opened their enterprises, built the roads and administrative buildings 
but also gave Albanians something they had never been able to achieve for 
themselves, the Greater Albania. The “new state” under the Italian guidance 
annexed territories of Kosovo and a big part of Western Macedonia where the 
Albanians were the majority of the population. The Italian occupation authorities 
founded Albanian media and schools and the dream of Albanian nationalist, 
although for a short period of time, became true. In September 1943, when Rome 
surrendered to the Allies, Germany took over and ruled until the end of the war. 
                                                
18 Fan Noli, main Ahmed Zogu’s political oppositionist and for a brief time Albanian prime minister 
(June –December 1924) attemped to re-open the question of Kosovo. Although  he did not include 
the members of Kosovo Committee in his government he accompanied them to the League of 
Nations in the fall of 1924. In December of 1924, Noli was ousted by Ahmed Zogu and this event put 
an end on Tirana’s activism in Kosovo.   
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 Quite surprisingly Albanians, who like to present themselves as one of the 
most freedom loving people in Europe, did not organize any armed resistance to the 
Axis until the beginning of 1942 when the Albanian Communist Party was formed. 
Almost exclusively a southern phenomenon (the majority of its leaders, Enver 
Hoxha included, were of Tosk origin) and deeply influenced and supported by the 
Yugoslav Communist Party, this organization was almost completely focused on the 
armed resistance against occupational forces and on the Albanian internal problems.  
On the other hand, the Albanians who did not trust the communists and called 
themselves “nationalist” founded another resistance organization called Balli 
Kombetar, led by Midhad Frasheri, ex minister in the first Albanian government.  
The dividing line between these two organizations was not only ideological 
and cultural, but it concerned the problem of national unification as well. While the 
foundation of the Greater Albania was decidedly on the political agenda of the 
nationalist movement, the communists, imbued with the ideas of Moscow dictated 
internationalism did not consider the Albanian national problem as one of its 
priorities. On the contrary, some party leaders even supported the idea of a new 
Yugoslav federation which would include Albania and Kosovo, ensuring in this way 
unity and prosperity of the Albanian nation as a whole. Other, less radical members 
of the party opted for a more cautious policy of preserving Albanian sovereignty and 
independence, but they as well, were much more concerned about preserving 
collaboration and solidarity between the YCP and the ACP then to protect their 
compatriots in Kosovo and Western Macedonia. Not only the ACP leaders left their 
compatriots in Yugoslavia but they also actively participated in repression of 
Albanian nationalists in Kosovo. In fact, in 1944, at Tito’s request, the Albanian 
Communists sent troops to disarm the population in Kosovo and to “prepare the way 
for the resumption of Yugoslav control. (Nicolas Pano, The People’s Socialist 
Republic of Albania – Baltimore, 1968) 
In the period between 1942 and 1949 the influence of the YCP on their 
Albanian like-minders was so strong that many argue that only the split between 
Tito and Stalin safeguarded Albanian independence of the state in its 1913 borders.  
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Albanians in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
The Albanians who found themselves in the newly created first Yugoslavia, 
quickly learned that theirs was an inferior status. In fact the Yugoslav state was from 
the beginning bitterly hostile to the ethnic Albanians. Yugoslavia literally means 
“land of south Slavs” and the Albanians of course knew that they were not. I have 
already argued that neither Slavs nor Albanians had any national consciousness until 
20th century, but each of them knew that they were not a member of the opposite 
group. A Slav was not a “Turk” (the name to describe a Muslim majority that 
included the Albanians as well), and a Turk was not a Gavur, a non-Muslim subject, 
an infidel. However the Slavs of Macedonia were in better position than their 
Albanian fellow-citizens. Even if they were not recognized as people and were 
considered by the Serb authorities as bumpkins with Serbian roots (Perry, 2000), 
they al least were the south Slavs while the numerous Albanians from Macedonia 
and Kosovo were usually portrayed as vile and alien “Turks”(Perry, 2000).  
 
In the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (latter Kingdom of Yugoslavia) 
the process of Serbianization in newly acquired territories of Macedonia and Kosovo 
was restless and affected all spheres of public life, education included. After 1918 
all Albanian schools in Kosovo and Macedonia were shut down. Still, the policies of 
assimilation through the education system did not give the expected results. In 
response to the state repressive measures Albanians withdrew their children from the 
state sponsored schools and it comes with no surprise that in the first half of the 20th 
century the illiteracy rate among Albanians was almost ninety percent. When it 
became clear that the assimilation attempts only encouraged the growth of Albanian 
nationalism and oppositional activity, the authorities from Belgrade adopted some 
more incisive measures of colonization and forced immigration. The 1914 law-
decree on Agrarian Reforms and Colonization encouraged settlement of Serbian and 
Montenegrin colonists in Kosovo and Macedonia and supported expropriation of the 
Albanian ownership and emigration. Along with these repressive measures the 
Albanian community reported in a 1921 petition to the League of Nations that since 
1918 about 12.371 people had been killed and 22.000 imprisoned.  
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 Consequently, the 1930s saw a worsening in the interethnic relations between 
the Slavs and the Albanians, which was seen as proof that policies had to be 
strengthened with more drastic measures. Such measures were most notably 
suggested by Cubrilovic in his 1939 project titled “The expulsion of Albanians”, in 
which he recommended the state authorities to force all Albanians to emigrate to 
Albania or Turkey. In fact, because of a Serbian repressive policy many Albanians 
decided to emigrate to Turkey and those who decided to stay in Yugoslavia were 
engaged in armed resistance and founded the Albanian religious schools, that 
became the center of nationalist activity. Of course some minority rights were 
recognized, although on the paper alone. In the early 1920s Albanians were allowed 
a political party, the “Islamic Association for the Defense of Justice” also known as 
Bashkim and two deputies from “Southern Serbia (Macedonia) and three from the 
Old Serbia (Kosovo) were elected to parliament in Belgrade. This Albanian political 
experience, however, was short lived and when the deputies came to oppose the 
Serbian government the party was abolished and its leader assassinated in 1929.  
There are no doubts that Albanians found themselves in a hostile state and in 
response, eventually sought to create their own  homogeneous national land. In 1918 
the Kosovo Committee was formed, fundamentally a clandestine resistance 
movement, which drew its membership from both sides of the border. Its minimum 
goals was the Yugoslav recognition and accommodation of Albanian minority rights 
while its long term ambition was the annexation to Albania of the territories 
primarily inhabited by Albanians. The Committee had supporters in Albania, 
especially among Albanians form the northeast, who had family and trade links with 
Kosovo, but it had enemies as well. Namely the government in Belgrade who 
considered them a possible threat for the state sovereignty but also the politicians in 
Tirana, who considered any aspiration of incorporating Kosovo as a possible disaster 
for Albania. Concerned more with domestic issues and the very survival of the state, 
Ahmed Zogu19 one of the Albania’s principal politicians in the interwar period, had 
no stomach for the Kosovo cause. In the exchange for Yugoslavia’s support in the 
                                                
19 Ahmed Zogu (1985-1961) was born of Muslim parents in the Mati area and acquired military 
experience during the World War I as a commander of the new Albanian army formed in 1916 by 
occupying Austrian forces. He played a leading role in departure of all foreign forces and consolidate 
his power as a interior minister until 1924. In 1924 be became president and in 1928 he proclaimed 
himself king. He ruled until 1939 when he was expelled by the Italians.  
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struggle for power, (in order to eliminate his opposers) he agreed to eliminate the 
Kosovo Committee and its leaders. The only concession Zogu gave to the Kosovo 
cause was in 1928 when he proclaimed himself not the King of Albania but the King 
of all Albanians. His commitment to a national cause was, however, only rhetorical.  
During World War II, the Albanian community in Yugoslavia had mixed 
feelings about placeing their allegiance. Some of them joined the partisan movement 
led by the Albanian Communist Party while the others joined the Balli Kombetar, 
the National Front, which was an anti-Communist and anti-royalist nationalistic 
group. Under Italian sponsorship, the Balli Kombetar aimed to create a “Greater 
Albania” which would include Albania, Kosovo, western Macedonia and other 
territories that were “stolen” or “occupied” by the neighboring Slav states. This 
policy was very attractive to Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia who had never 
lost their sense of shared national consciousness but also given the treatment of 
Kosovars and Macedonian Albanians during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. For this 
reason many Albanians joined the National Front and fought against the partisans 
making them enemies of the local Serbian and Macedonian population as well.  
Consequently, the image of an Albanian ambition to create a “Greater Albania” was 
firmly imprinted in the consciousness of Serbs and Macedonians.  
 
How to create a nation? The main elements of the Albanian national 
identity.  
 
 The process of Albanian nation building and self-confirmation as a distinct 
ethnic, linguistic and cultural community cannot be understood unless we put it in 
the context of the 19th century Balkans. Although similar to other Balkan national 
movements, the Albanian one had to overcome serious obstacles, that most of their 
neighbours had either surmounted or had never faced along their path toward 
affirmation of their distinct national identities. 
If we consider the fact that Albanians had been isolated from the external 
world for centuries, administratively divided and had suffered from a numerous 
dangerously centrifugal forces, the fathers of Albanian nationalism, in order to stop 
what they considered the “already advanced process of erosion of the national 
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sentiment” singled out the language as the most reliable unifying element. Yet, the 
codification and the introduction of the Albanian language in the educational system 
and public life proved to be quite problematic. First, the Albanian culture was 
principally a popular and folkloristic one, without any relevant written tradition. 
Another serious obstacle in the affirmation of a separate Albanian identity and 
introduction of the Albanian language as a medium of education were the central 
Ottoman authorities.  For the Supreme Port, Albanian territories represented not 
only a borderland defensive belt but also a cheap source of cannon fodder for its 
military campaigns. For this reason they did not have any interest in recognising  
Albanians as a separate ethnic group and to encourage use and development of the 
Albanian language. Considered simply as Turks or as Orthodox, Albanians were 
forced to receive their education in Turkish or Greek and were not allowed to use 
their language not even after the Tanzimat reforms when the usage of mother 
tongues became possible for almost all Ottoman subjects.20 The result of such 
policies and the objective lack of a written literate tradition was that in the second 
half of the 19th century very few Albanians believed that their language could or 
should be written. In fact, it was only in 1908 at the Congress of Monastir that the 
Albanians codified their first alphabet and adopted the Latin script. The choice of 
Latin script was a strategic move. Although innocent in appearance it was a 
powerful factor in unification but also signified a breaking away from Turkish-
Islamic culture and orientation toward the West. In 1916, at a meeting in Shkoder 
the first attempt was made to create a common literary Albanian  language. The 
participants chose the Gheg idiom from the town of Elbasan as a basis of a future 
Albanian literate language. However, the language issue remained open for a long 
time and it was only in 1972 that a Unified Albanian Language was adopted.  
In the process of nation building of almost all Balkan nations the re-creation 
of history played a very important role and Albania was not an exception. In order to 
develop and foster a sense of common belonging, Albanians as well needed a shared 
                                                
20 The Tanzimat, meaning reorganization of the Ottoman empire, was a period of reformation that 
began in 1839 and ended in 1876. the ambitious project was launched to combat the slow decline of 
the Empire that had seen its borders shrink, and was going weaker in comparison to the European 
powers. By getting rid of the millet system, the Ottoman authorities hoped to integrate non-Muslims 
and non- Turks more thoroughly into Ottoman society by enhancing their civil liberties and granting 
them liberty throughout the Empire.  
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common history, and if they were to survive and ensure their existence in the Balkan 
environment they as well, had to produce evidence of their historical continuity. To 
justify their claims to the land they inhabit, Albanians had to prove not only that 
they are an autochthonous population in the Western Balkans but also that they had 
been living there longer than their neighbours. Since in the historical sources 
Albanians are rarely mentioned as distinctive ethnic group the first generation of 
Albanian writers traced the emergence of the nation back to the mythical 
Pellasgians. Soon this theory was replaced by more convincing Illyrian descent 
theory  and became one of the pillars of Albanian nationalism. The existence of  an 
Illyrian population in ancient times was quite well documented in historical sources 
and was a proof , at least on paper, of Albanian ethnic and historical continuity in 
Kosovo and other areas contested by Serbs, Montenegrins and Greeks. The fathers 
of the nation however, were not only concerned with the nation’s external borders 
but they also had an important task to consolidate the sense of common belonging. 
In this process the use of history has to be selective. Like many other nations, 
Albanians as well had to learn what binds them together and to forget what 
separated them in the past. For this reason some historical events were simply 
omitted or reshaped while others were excessively emphasized. For example, the 
seven centuries of Byzantine domination was almost never mentioned in the official 
national narratives because it could have been associated with Orthodoxy in a 
country where the majority of the population had become Muslim while the role of 
Skanderbeg and his rebellion against Ottomans was reinvented and transformed into 
a myth. George Kastrioti was a rather well documented historical figure whose 
memory was still alive in oral tradition, and although his action had never really 
involved all Albanians, his heroic tragedy had all necessary ingredients for building 
up a myth of “continuous resistance” against numerous enemies over the centuries. 
Of course, in order to transform Kastrioti into a symbol of national cohesion and 
resistance some adjustments had to be done. In particular, his Christian orientation 
was minimized or avoided. His figure was useful also in the creation of a myth of 
Albanian centuries long pro-western orientation. This argument was very useful in 
convincing Albanians to turn their backs to their Ottoman past but also in 
convincing the European Great Powers that the Albanians had sacrificed themselves 
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in defending Europe from the Turks and to earn their support for the foundation of 
an independent Albanian state.  
Although we can draw numerous parallels between the Albanian and other 
nationalisms, the Albanian case had some particular aspects that distinguished them 
from their immediate surroundings. While in other countries of the region, religion 
played a fundamental role in the process of nation building in Albania it was seen as 
a serious obstacle. In order to overcome substantial religious differences within the 
country Albanian national ideologists tried to find solution for the problem by 
making nationalism an alternative to the existing religions and in assuming from the 
very beginning quite anti-clerical attitude. At the end of the 19th century Vaso Pasha 
coined a concept of “Albanism” (“the real religion of Albanians is Albanism”)  
which was widely accepted and almost deified by the Albanian population. In fact, 
Albanians not only have a long tradition of peaceful religious coexistence, but are 
also the only Muslim people in Europe who fought together with their Christian 
compatriots against the central Ottoman authorities, and who proclaimed as their 
national hero a men who for decades fought against Turkish domination.  Yet, 
concern for religion as a potential seed of discord is constant in Albanian recent 
history and there were different proposals which, although different from each other, 
all aimed to neutralize possible negative effects of religious factor21. With the 
creation of the Albanian state, King Zogu adopted the strategy of the 
“nationalisation of religion” which imposed state control over all religious 
institutions and reduced to a minimum any external influence.  
In 1912 Albania became an independent state and for the first time in history 
the Albanians had sovereign control over a particular territory. The state was 
established but the nation had still to be created. In the last decades of the 19th 
century a handful of intellectuals began to forge the Albanian national identity. With 
independence the nation building process became more dynamic because the 
foundation of the state made it imperative to create a sense of common belonging. In 
order to disseminate and develop national cohesion and integration, national 
ideologists used all means at their disposal. Similar to many other nation building 
processes they developed a unified code of national values and symbols, creating in 
                                                
21 The proposals ranged from introduction of Bektashism as pan-Albanian religion to mass 
conversions to Protestantism.  
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this way the necessary normative framework which made possible the imposition of 
state control on society. But if they were to overcome significant social, cultural and 
religious differences inherited from the past they had to integrate the Albanians into 
one homogeneous ideology of a shared cultural and historical heritage. The doctrine 
or rather myth of national unity became central to national ideology and articulated 
at several levels. At a social level, the emphasis was put on domestic national unity 
while in a broader sense emphasis was put on the unity of the Albanian nation as a 
whole, regardless of the fact that the demarcation of borders had left about forty 
percent of all Albanians outside of the Albanian state. The fact that national 
ideologists gave such a great importance to this doctrine is the best evidence of the 
problems encountered in the process of building national cohesion and integration.  
Disastrous consequences of hatred, alienation, religious division and 
disunion among Albanians were described by N. Frasheri in his article “We Are 
Dying Out” . “A nation, claiming to be alive, should be united, should have its own 
language and history, should be civilized, because as it is, wild with no civilization 
and knowledge, it would not last long. These recommendations were taken seriously 
by the Albanian political leaders and ideologists and it is not surprising that social 
and cultural homogenization was considered a priority not only during the reign of 
King Zog but also during the communist period. This was done through the 
centralization of power, the spreading of public administration, the destruction of 
existing local autonomies, introduction of the new national narratives, education in 
the native language etc.   
 As elsewhere the building of social and national cohesion was sough (done) 
through the centralization of power, the spreading of public administration, the 
destruction of existing local autonomies, education in native language but also 
through some more incisive measures adopted by the communist regime  
As in to many other nation building processes, the Albanian one also sought to 
achieve the necessary level of social and cultural cohesion  through the 
centralization of power, the spreading of public administration, the destruction of 
existing local autonomies, education in the native language as well as through some 
more incisive measures adopted by the communist regime. After Second World War 
the selective use of history continued, aimed mainly at legitimizing Albanian leaders 
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and their policies rather than increasing the level of social cohesion. Although, as 
elsewhere in Europe, Communism in Albania began as a complete rejection of the 
past, Enver Hoxha realized very soon how a selective use of history and tradition 
could increase his power. In order to establish legitimacy for his regime he created 
the myth of constant resistance where the armed partisan resistance was represented 
as a continuation and glorious epilogue of Skandarbeg’s insurrection against the 
Ottomans. Eventually, the reinterpretation of history reached the level of paranoia 
and made Albania one of the world’s most isolated countries. 22 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 In the myth of constant resistance Enver Hohxa was represented as a the heir of Skanderbeg.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
The Albanian community in the  Yugoslavia.  
 
 
The specific feature of the Balkans is the concentration of diversities 
(geographical, historical, ethnic, civilizational and cultural) in a comparatively 
small space. The Yugoslav Federation (established in November 1943) 
inherited cultural, ethnic and religious differences that had coexisted in the 
Balkans for centuries, and approached them in a new way. In an effort to 
integrate the various populations into a new state, with a new system of social 
justice and faster economic and social development, the ruling elite decided, 
on the one hand to recognize the existence of differences and on the other hand 
to treat them as “specificities”,  marginalized as much as possible, in order to 
create one state out of many ethnicities and nations. The final goal of Yugoslav 
leaders was to create a new man and a new socialist culture. In the first years 
of existence of the state, the integrative efforts were based on the idea of 
creating a Yugoslav nation based on similarities between the Slavic people. In 
its democratic version (Democratic Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) the 
common state was perceived as an instrument of gradual amalgamation of 
these commonness without the hegemony of any of its constituent parts.  
Considering the ethnic potpourri within the country, and the fact that 
most of the people who joined the Yugoslav Federation had different political, 
social, cultural and religious backgrounds, the existence of the state was not 
justified on the basis of its naturalness (as the inevitable outgrowth of shared 
culture and history), but rather on its constructiveness  expressed trough the 
free will of different nations to join together in the new state. There was no 
rhetoric of an ancient past and no suggestions that the Yugoslav nation had 
existed in the past. It was acknowledged that the South Slavs had been in the 
Balkans since the 6th century, but it was also acknowledged that their histories 
and fates had been separated until 1918, when the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats 
and Slovenes was established. Nevertheless, the experience of a common state, 
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which existed in the period between 1918 and 1941, played no role in the new 
State’s self-image. The Kingdom was labeled as a “dungeon of nations” and 
the communist party was careful not to repeat the mistake of the Serbian elite 
that antagonized all other national groups through the policy of domination. 
Rather, the new state made a virtue out of novelty and non-conformity, and 
was constructed along very different lines. “The Yugoslav political leaders 
understood that the policy of a unified nation state, based on an “imperialistic” 
attempt to deny the nationhood of many people making up Yugoslavia would 
fail” (Cohen and Warwick, 1983). Even if the ruling elite, in the first decades, 
was probably nostalgic towards some form of Yugoslavism, they were very 
careful not to impose it on the nations of Yugoslavia (Sekulic, 2001). In its 
socialist version (Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia) the state was 
constructed as a federal state based on the equality of its six constituent nations 
and divided according to national lines. The national identity became one of 
the principal criteria for constituting the political system and the idea of 
Yugoslavism was labeled as “artificial” and finally abandoned. However, even 
if the state with the 1974 constitution became less centralized, communist 
leadership was hoping that through the policy of “brotherhood and unity”, 
without the enforcement of Yugoslavism and the expression of national 
aspirations through the federal system, the nationalist aspirations could be 
satisfied and the integrity of the state would be consolidated and preserved 
(Sekulic, 2001). Federalism and the decision of Yugoslav leaders not to link 
citizens together directly into a state identity, but to operate through the ethnic 
medium, was one of the peculiar characteristics of Yugoslav nationalism. 
Instead of being simply Yugoslav citizens, and have a single mode of 
belonging to the state, the peoples of Yugoslavia were above all members of 
the Croatian, Slovenian, Serbian, Macedonian, Bosnian and Montenegrin 
nation, associated with the particular territory of one of the countries republics. 
One may argue, as some do, that the definition of nations in primordial terms 
was more or less taken for granted in the former Yugoslavia, and that the 
national and not state identity represented the primary political attachment. 
Yet, with being Croats, Macedonians, Slovenes, members of different nations 
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were also members, loyal citizens of the multinational and multiethnic 
Yugoslav state. This secondary, and in some cases even primary, focus of 
loyalty gained prominence, and the people of some constituent parts of 
Yugoslavia (Macedonia for example) felt a strong affiliation to the Yugoslav 
state. The Yugoslav identity (both national and state) in the period from the 
60s to the late 80s represented the way of escaping ethnic essentialism, and 
overcoming traditional nationalism, and most importantly  this kind of 
identification had some elements of civil identity of the western type. In the 
1991 the Yugoslav Federation broke up, and together with the state the civil 
way of identification was lost.  
    The Yugoslav federation was a multinational and multicultural state, 
whose legitimacy was based on a specific variant of socialism and its leading 
role in the non-aligned movement. Considering that the legitimacy of the state 
was strongly linked with the communist ideology, there was no chance for the 
state to survive the dissolution of communism (Sekulic, 1997). In fact, after the 
fall of the communist ideology, the Yugoslav Federation and its particular state 
building pattern broke-up, but as Appadurai points out “by instituting a system 
of an intermediate stage of belonging, Federal Yugoslavia could be said to 
have represented an attempt by its leaders to think beyond the nation” 
(Appadurai, 1993).  
 
The Growth of the Albanian Nationalism 
 Albanians in Kosovo 
The 1960s represented the turning point for the Yugoslav Albanians. In 
1966, Aleksandar Rankovic head of the Yugoslav security forces, famous for its 
pro-Serbian and anti-Albanian policy was discharged and the role of the Serb-
dominated UDBAa and its anti-Albanian policies were significantly limited in the 
province. At the same time the Yugoslav state moved toward greater 
decentralization, by which the federal units received more power. Encouraged by 
this new political situation, the Yugoslav Albanians increased their national 
consciousness, and some of them began to gather up forces demanding more group 
rights.  
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   In 1968 there were large-scale demonstrations in Prishtina, where the 
Kosovar       Albanians expressed their dissatisfaction with their minority status, 
demanding that the republican status be granted to provinces of Kosovo and 
Metohija as well as the establishment of an Albanian language university23. These 
demonstrations were followed by similar demonstrations in Tetovo where the 
Albanian nationalists demanded to join Kosovo in a seventh republic. Of course, the 
Albanian demands were labeled as irredentist and firmly denied by the authorities in 
Skopje and Belgrade.  
However, the Albanian demonstrators achieved a part of their objectives. In 
1970, Prishtina University was established and in 1974, the new federal Constitution 
provided for virtual self-rule to the Autonomous Region of Kosovo. What Kosovo 
gained with this constitution was a republic without republican status. As Albanian 
political leader Azem Vlasi observed, “Kosovo functioned as a republic in the 
federal state of Yugoslavia and we were not a republic only by name”. The status of 
an autonomous province of Serbia made it possible for the provincial political elite 
to create direct links with the federation authorities and to bypass the republican 
ones.  By this constitution, the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo obtained a 
constitution for the first time in its history, according to which it had the right to 
regulate independently its social and economic affaires and its political bodies. The 
Kosovo Assembly was defined as the highest institution of self-management and 
had the power to change the constitution of SAP Kosovo, had a vote in the event of 
change to the federal Constitution, and the power to decide on other crucial 
questions regarding the political, social and cultural development of the region. It 
also had the power to issue laws and budgets and to appoint or recall members of the 
Assembly, the judges of the Constitutional Court and judges of the Supreme Court. 
In other words, from 1974 onwards, Kosovo had almost all the prerogatives of other 
federal units (republics) while the federation controlled the country’s monetary, 
military and foreign affairs.  The changes brought by the 1974 Constitution 
significantly increased participation of Albanians in political institutions not only at 
the regional but also on the federal level and in diplomacy.  
                                                
23 Regardless the fact that in former Yugoslavia lived more than 2 million Albanians and that they 
outnumbered Macedonians and Slovenes they had never been recognized as people but only as 
nationality,  
 54 
From the Albanian perspective, the broader range of political and cultural 
rights in Kosovo and high rates of Albanian participation in the political institutions 
of the federation were not enough and they still felt they were being unequally 
treated. In effect, as statistical data from the 60s and 70s show, the Albanians were 
underrepresented in state-run enterprises and in the League of Communists, their 
economic status was low and cultural institutions inadequate. But the major cause of 
Albanian discontent was refusal of the Federation to grant the Albanian population 
symbolic equality with other Slav nationalities and to recognize the republican status 
of Kosovo.  
Regarding ethnic relations, in the period between 1968 and 1981 those 
between Albanians and Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo were improving, at least 
in official discourses, supported by communist ideology and its slogans of 
“brotherhood and unity” but also due to the improved socio-economic and cultural 
conditions of the Albanian population. However, leaving a side some examples of 
cooperation, above all in the economic sphere, there was no will to create a 
multiethnic society with stable and lasting institutions. Substantial social, economic, 
religious and cultural differences between the two major ethnic communities 
generated in history were not erased and Serbs and Kosovars continued to coexisted 
peacefully although as communities apart 
Along with its complicated history and difficult ethnic relations it should be 
noted that Kosovo was the poorest and less developed region in the former 
Yugoslavia. In order to overcome economic hardships in the region the federal 
authorities in the 1970s established the so-called “Federation fund for inducing a 
faster development of undeveloped regions” in which Kosovo had a significant 
share of 37-45%24. However, despite significant federal state incentives the 
development gap between Kosovo and other republics increased. Official statistics 
indicate that in 1952, Kosovo’s per capita social product was 44% of the Yugoslav 
average and in 1988 it drooped to 27%. Such poor economic performance was 
translated into high unemployment rates, two and a half times higher than official 
rates in the rest of the Federation. In such a strained economic situation, poorly 
                                                
24 In the period between 1971 and 1988 the more developed republic of Yugoslavia gave 3% of their 
income for the development of underdeveloped republics.  
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educated Albanians were at a disadvantage. In fact, in 1981, 77% percent of 
unemployed people were Albanians. 
Despite the socialist rhetoric of “Brotherhood and Unity”, undoubted 
improvement of social and cultural conditions of Kosovo Albanians provided by the 
1974 Constitution and higher rates of Albanian participation in the political 
institutions of the federation, in March 1981 Kosovo Albanians rioted again. There 
are many disagreements and controversies about the intentions and real motivation 
of the demonstrators. The initial riot began in a cafeteria at the University of 
Prishtina where students expressed their concern and frustration over a number of 
issues: unemployment, unwillingness of the federal state to recognize inadequacy of 
higher education and inferior status of Albanians in the province. These 
dissatisfactions were symbolized by the scarce quality of the food, bad living 
conditions, overcrowding and underfunding of the University of Prishtina. Soon the 
student demonstrations grew into a mass protest all across Kosovo but, instead of the 
improvement of living conditions for students the protesters asked for the creation of 
a “Socialist Republic of Kosovo”.  
The response of federal authorities on Albanian demands was sharp and 
exaggerated and showed the federal state’s inability to understand the real nature of 
the Kosovo problem. Instead of accommodation of Albanian claims for symbolic 
equality with the Slav nationalities, i.e republic status, the federal authorities 
declared a state of emergency, deployed tanks and the federal army, closed schools 
and described demonstrations as “aggressive, ruthless, brutal and devastating actions 
with scope of forming the Republic of Kosovo, which would secede from Serbia and 
Yugoslavia25. As some external observers suggested, the events of 1981 in Kosovo 
were to be understood as a part of a larger historical example of ethnicity and 
nationalism in the Balkans. In the words of a well known Serbian journalist 
Aleksandar Tijanic  “the Yugoslav authorities grossly underestimate to what extent 
the idea of a Kosovo republic seems natural to most Albanians”.  
In a period that followed the demonstrations many protesters were arrested 
and Albanian political leaders recalled26. Yet, these were not the major 
                                                
25 According to all Yugoslav constitutions only nations and respective republic had right to secession.  
26 From 1981 forward, Kosovo Albanians made up highest percentage of political prisoners in SFRY. 
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consequences of the 1981 events. Serbian authorities, who had never been satisfied 
with the autonomous status of its provinces proposed to revise the constitution and 
find an alternative to the 1974 de facto status of Kosovo. They argued that the 
autonomous status of Kosovo had already brought disunity to the Republic of 
Serbia, that regardless of all the concessions Kosovo Albanians were never satisfied 
with their status and that were not striving for some significant improvement of the 
status, but rather for secession form Serbia and Yugoslavia. Between 1981 and 1991 
Kosovo officially preserved its autonomy but Serbs de facto reinforced its power 
over the province.  With the excuse of fighting Albanian irredentism introduced 
some restrictive measures and impose almost complete police control over the 
region. During the 1980s, the majority of Yugoslav citizens who were arrested under 
article 136 of the federal criminal code for “association for purposes of hostile 
activity” were Kosovars. Along with being labeled as a serious threat to a territorial 
integrity of the state Kosovars were also accused of implementing a deliberate 
strategy of “Albanization” . It has been argued, that the Albanian high birthrates are 
due to a conscious decision of Albanians to reproduce rapidly in order to change the 
demographic picture of Kosovo27. In order to give some support to these 
assumptions they used the statistical data that actually showed that the Albanian 
population in Kosovo significantly increased in a period between 1948 and 1981, 
while the proportion of Serbs and Montenegrins fell28. The decrease of the Slav 
population was explained not only with Albanian demographic expansion but also 
with the mass migrations of Serbs from Kosovo. Although the Serb migration from 
the province had been constant since the early 1940s, it was only after 1981 that the 
problem became an object of public debate. From  a different studies, almost all 
commissioned by the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences Since, it emerged that 
the “mass” emigration of Serbs from Kosovo originated from non-economic factors 
but as a result of fear, constant pressure and the failure of the state to protect the 
people and their proprieties. In the meantime the newspapers began to report about 
violence against private and state property, attacks on police and provincial 
                                                                                                                                    
 
27 In 1979 the birth rate in Kosovo was 26.1, which was the highest in Europe.  
28 According to the official statistics in 1948 there were 498.000 Albanians, 171.000 Serbs and 
28.000 Montenegrins. In 1971 Albanians were 917.000, Serbs 228.000 and Montenegrins 31.000. In 
1981, the number of Albanians increased to 1,226.000 while the number of Serbs fell to 209.000. 
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authorities, about sexual violence and general mistreatment of Kosovo’s Serbs and 
Montenegrins. In addition, the Serbs from Kosovo considered themselves to be 
discriminated against in the labor market, in provincial courts and in police forces. 
All these “facts” contributed a mass, grass root, ethnic mobilization of Kosovo 
Serbs. In the early 1980s Kosovo Serbs started to organize a small scale local 
meetings and protests against discrimination and asked for the protection of their 
rights and establishment of law and order. Soon these “spontaneous” meeting were 
transformed into a mass movement capable of involving thousands of people and the 
local Serbs shifted their agenda from the local security problem to the issues of 
broader political significance including the constitutional issues as well. The 
protesters argued that if the provincial authorities were unable to guarantee 
protection for the Serbs and to stop their “mass” migration form Kosovo then the 
province should be brought back under direct control of Serbia’s authority. Serbian 
activists sought the support of influential people and established contacts with 
dissident intellectuals like Dobrica Cosic (a well known writer who had been purged 
from the Communist League because of his nationalist writings and policies) but 
also with a young generation of Serbian politicians, like Slobodan Milosevic, who 
soon became their protector and used their support to secure the leadership of the 
League of Communists of Serbia in 1987. The final outcome of this collaboration 
was further aggravation of already seriously compromised ethnic relations between 
Kosovo’s Serbs and Albanians.  
 
Until 1991 and the formal dissolution of the Yugoslav federation all 
Kosovo’s issues and crises were treated on a federal level. But with the declaration 
of independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia 
Kosovars found themselves ones more in a Serbian state characterized by  fierce 
nationalism. After 15 years, Serbian authorities finally got an opportunity to revise 
the constitution and re-establish a complete political and social control over the 
region.         
In March 1989 militant Albanian miners from the Trepca mine went on strike 
and occupied the mine management office. They demanded the resignation of 
provincial leaders imposed on them by Serbian authorities and suggested that any 
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constitutional limitation of Kosovo’s autonomy should be subject to democratic 
debate. In response to Kosovar’s demands, Serbia’s National Assembly passed the 
controversial amendment that would eventually return Kosovo to Serbian control. A 
few days later there were mass protests all across Kosovo. Serbian authorities ones 
more time declared the state of emergency, deployed special security forces and 
suppressed demonstrations in a bloodbath.  It had been reported that many 
Albanians were killed shot by the Serbian police and army.  
In June of the same year, in Gazimestan (central Kosovo) Slobodan 
Milosevic delivered his famous nationalistic speech in occasion of six hundred years 
of Serbian defeat in the Battle of Kosovo. This event was described by many 
commentators and observers as presaging the collapse of the Yugoslav Federation 
and the bloody wars that followed. In that occasion, in front of a crowd of half a 
million people, he spoke about the possibility of “armed battles” in future of the 
Serbian national development and made a clear parallel between the Battle of 
Kosovo and present times trying to illude to the fact that the Serbs who fought 
against the Turks in the past were somehow the same Serbs who today, were 
fighting for Serbian national survival. In his speech, Kosovo had a central role 
“Nobody should be surprised that Serbia raised its head because of Kosovo this 
summer. Kosovo is the pure center of our history, culture and memory. Every nation 
has one love that worms its heart. For Serbia it is Kosovo. The message for 
Albanians was clear.  
One year later, the Serbian government implemented constitutional changes 
and remove the legal basis for Kosovo’s autonomy. The Kosovo parliament was 
suspended and Belgrade imposed its direct rule over the province. Kosovars 
responded with the establishment of a parallel institution the “Assembly of the 
Republic of Kosovo” with  headquarters in Zagreb and decided to organize a 
referendum on Kosovo’s sovereignty. The referendum was backed by the majority 
of Albanians and Ibrahim Rugova emerged as a leader of the Kosovar liberation 
movement.  
In the period that followed foreign observers, journalist and international 
NGOs reported about severe violations of Albanian civil and human rights, Serbian 
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repression, strained economic situation and poverty. Ethnic tensions increased to a 
point of no return and finally escalated into an armed conflict in 1999.  
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Albanians in Macedonia 
 
With regards to the Albanian community in Macedonia, the changes brought 
about by the 1974 Constitution  did not mean much since they continued to be 
considered as a minority in the Republic of Macedonia and as such had been granted 
only cultural rights.  
The events in Kosovo in 1968 and 1981 were mirrored by similar even if on 
a smaller scale nationalist manifestations by the Albanians in the Republic of 
Macedonia. The proposed “seventh republic”, which was to include the Albanian-
inhabited areas of western Macedonia, was seen as a serious threat to the territorial 
integrity but even to the very existence of the Macedonian nation (Perry, 2000). As 
an answer to the Albanian nationalist claims, the Macedonian authorities introduced 
some special measures which circumscribed considerably the rights of the Albanian 
community. The Albanian names “which stimulated nationalist sentiment and 
adherence to the People’s Republic of Albania” were banned from the registrar of 
the Tetovo municipality, the Albanian folksongs were also banned and some 
Albanian officials were dismissed from the state administration for attending 
Albanian weddings at which “nationalist” songs were sung (Poulton, 1998).  
For the Albanian population in SR Macedonia it was perhaps events 
concerning education and language which caused the most opposition. At the 
beginning of the 1987 school year, the authorities canceled the Albanian-language in 
secondary schools. The Macedonian and the Albanian students were integrated and 
school lessons were in the Macedonian language. The next year, the authorities 
decided to introduce bilingual education in the Albanian schools. The Albanian 
parents protested, and many children were withdrawn from the bilingual schools.  
The same year, as reported by ATA, the official news agency of Albania, 
Tetovo municipality introduced a “package of administrative measures” aimed at 
restraining the birth rate among Albanians. According to these new measures, the 
families with more than two children were required to pay for the health care of 
additional children (Poulton, 1998). 
In this political surrounding the relations between the Albanians and the 
Macedonians     deteriorated and mutual resentment grew.  
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  As I have already stated in the first chapter, the Albanians were never 
satisfied with their legal and political position in Former Yugoslavia. At the time of 
Socialist Yugoslavia, the then Socialist Republic of Macedonia proclaimed the 
equality of all citizens and the principle of non-discrimination on national grounds. 
By law, the existence of the minorities was recognized and was defined by special 
laws. According to the 1974 Constitution, Macedonia had been a “state of the 
Macedonian people and the Albanian and Turkish minorities“. The theoretical legal 
framework provided by this Constitution at first sight enabled a vast area of rights 
and freedoms for the minority communities. But this was just theory since the great 
formal rights just enabled partial covering of the factual discrimination. National 
minorities such as the Turks, the Roma, the Vlachs, the Albanians and others were 
neglected and did not enjoy the same support for development by the state 
institutions like the members of mainstream Slavic culture. This kind of treatment of 
the national minorities created and emphasized the differences at the socio-
economic, cultural and educational level.  
Fear of the ther, poor mutual understanding and nationalist thinking kept the 
Macedonians and the Albanians from cooperation. The new 1989 Macedonian 
constitution even worsened this situation. While according to the 1974 Constitution, 
Macedonia had been a “state of the Macedonian people and the Albanian and 
Turkish minorities,” the 1989 constitution said that Macedonia is the “national state 
of the Macedonian nation29 meaning the Orthodox, ethnic Macedonians who are the 
native speakers of Macedonian. Albanians saw this as a reduction of the status and 
rights, while ethnic Macedonian officials viewed the change as a way to strengthen 
the national integrity of the Macedonian people. Unwilling to accept this situation 
the Albanians formed political parties based on ethnic lines in order to improve their 
status and bring changes by all means at their disposal, democratic or other. The 
main goal of the Albanian politicians was to gain status of equal partners in the state 
and to escape minority status. 
                                                
29 On the legal ground, anyone who is a citizen of the Republic of Macedonia is Macedonian. 
But Albanians and members of other ethnic groups prefer to identify themselves not as Macedonians 
in any sense, but as part of their own ethnos, living in the Republic of Macedonia. An Albanian is an 
Albanian and does not wish to be called anything else. 
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 They demanded to make the Albanian an official state language and to gain 
the right to fly the Albanian flag alongside that of the state flag. 
  With the proclamation of independence in November 1991 ethnic 
tensions between Macedonians and Albanians increased significantly. 
Following the independence the newly created Macedonia state, whose state 
but also national identity, had been contested by almost all its neighbors, has 
passed through the period of strong national reawakening30. In order to support 
national group consolidation, which was politically very important in a short 
period that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the Macedonians made a 
significant effort to assert separateness and uniqueness of the Macedonian 
nation. In this new political and social environment there was simply no room 
for national minorities and their claims. It can not be stated that the 
Macedonians did not recognize some minorities collective rights like the right 
to primary and secondary education in their native language and representation 
in media and state institutions. Still, this was not enough to create a homeland 
for its numerous minorities, especially Albanians, who made up 27% of the 
overall population of the state. The Albanian community Macedonia is not 
only numerous but it is also highly concentrated in the western part of the 
country, bordering on a predominantly Albanian province of Kosovo and the 
Republic of Albania. This ethnic continuum, as well as relative economic 
independence and close family and economic ties with other Albanian 
communities provides the Albanians with a sense of being a part of a great 
Albanian, economically self-sustainable community able to face up with a 
small and weak Macedonian state.  
The Albanian claims ranged from the right to use their language in public 
administration and education, to the right to use the Albanian flag and the 
                                                
30 The Macedonians as a separate national identity were recognized only in the 1945. Until then they 
were considered Bulgarians or Serbs. When Macedonia declared its independence in 1991, the state, 
but also the national identity of the Macedonian people was contested by almost all its neighbours. 
Bulgaria, Macedonia’s neighbour to the east, recognized the state but it does not recognize the 
existence of a separate Macedonian national identity and language. Greece did not contest the 
existence of a separate national identity but still fails to recognize the state. They claimed that the 
name Macedonia and use of the flag (Alexander’s Star of Vergina) imposed territorial claims on the 
Greek region with the same name. The Serbs were and still are sceptical about historian existence of 
any fixed ethnic identity among Slavs in the contemporary Macedonia before the second half of the 
20th century. The state and national identity are also contested within the country because Albanian 
minority likes to portray Macedonian nation as an artificial product of Titoist brainwashing. 
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demand to become the second constitutive people of the republic31. These 
requests, labeled as exaggerated and a serious threat for the state integrity were 
all rejected by the Macedonian state authorities.  
  Since Macedonia became independent at the end of 1991, there were 
several armed conflicts between the official state administration and the local 
Albanians. In February 1995, in a village called Mala Recica, the police 
prevented by force the opening of the unrecognized university in Albanian. On 
this occasion one demonstrator was killed, several were wounded and the 
heads of the controversy went to prison for a long time. Two years later, during 
the demonstrations in Gostivar three Albanian who claimed more cultural 
rights were killed and the Mayor of the town who hoisted the Albanian flag on 
the Town Hall was sentenced to reclusion in prison. However, the most 
outstanding event was the armed conflict of National Liberation Army (UCK) 
with governmental forces in the spring 2001, which brought the country to the 
brink of civil war. The armed conflict lasted seven months and ended with the 
Ohrid Agreement, which awwarned the Albanians but also other communities 
considerably broader collective rights than the Constitution had granted them 
until then.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
31 The reference to language is typical of Albanian nationalism and a main marker of their national 
identity. Throughout the entire political separation between Albania and Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav 
Albanians adopted the linguistic reforms decided on the conference on spelling held in Tirana in 
1972. From the Albanian point of view an Albanian remains Albanian as long as he speaks the 
Albanian language. If he loses his language due to the exclusive use of Macedonia or Serbian, he 
becomes “assimilated”. Thus, the Albanians demanded the government to endorse the widest possible 
use of their language. The position of Albanian parties was that the Albanian should become the 
country’s second language, equal in status to Macedonian. Language claims were also maid in area of 
education, especially in university education.  
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Republic of Albania  
  Unlike their Yugoslav “compatriots” who in a period between 1945 and 
1999 had to fight for their basic political, social, cultural and group rights, 
Albanians in Republic of Albania found themselves in a “new” communist 
guided country and lived mostly a different story. In 1946, Enver Hoxha a 
leader of the Albanian Communist party proclaimed the establishment of the 
Republic of Albania and introduced in a short time a totalitarian regime of a 
Stalinist type. The newly created state inherited almost all the problems and 
internal and external controversies that characterized the previous system and 
since the very beginning had to face up with a number of internal and 
international issues. After the Tito-Stalin split, the Albanian communists who 
since the foundation of the party had been closely related to their Yugoslav 
colleagues, interrupted all relations with the Yugoslav state and  became an 
obedient and close ally of the Soviet Union. In 1949 Albania closed its borders 
and interrupted all economic, cultural and family ties that Northern Albanians 
held with Kosovars and Macedonian Albanians.   
 In the same year Albania became a member of  the Council of Mutual 
Economic Aid, and in 1955 it joined the Warsaw Pact. In the first years of the 
existence of the “New Albania”, as Enver Hoxha liked to portray the country, 
did not differ from other Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe. But soon the 
things changed. Although the official relationships with Moscow had never 
been interrupted, the Moscow attempt to improve its relations with Yugoslavia 
were seen as a sort of betrayal and official Tirana reduce its contacts with the 
Soviet Union to a minimum. In the early 1960s Albania found its partner in the 
Communist China, but this partnership as well did not last long. Starting from 
the early 1970s, Albania who in Hoxha’s words, remained loyal to the 
principals successively betrayed by China and Soviet Union, began to develop 
“its own socialism”. Surrounded by rapacious neighbors (it should be noted 
that in the post war period none of its neighbors actually had territorial claims 
toward Albania) and threatened by the imperialist United States, Western 
Europe and betrayers of the Communist ideology like Soviet Union and China, 
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the Working Party of Albania (ex Communist Party) decided that the almost 
complete isolation of the country was the only way to ensure its survival and 
development. This paranoia reached its climax in a period between the 1960s 
and 1980s when the communist party forbid its people listening to foreign 
radio stations and to watch foreign TV programs. Any attempt to break the 
rules and obtain external information was severely punished and many 
Albanians were imprisoned. Traveling abroad required special permissions 
which were issued only for state representatives. 
   Even the family ties were interrupted. Albanians were not allowed to visit their 
relatives in Kosovo or Macedonia and the foreigners in mixed marriages were 
offered to choose between leaving the country or staying but cutting any 
contacts with their homeland. Such isolation resulted in almost full deficit of 
information about the external world.  
  For decades the economic life was dominated by the centrally planned 
economy and a number of state controlled enterprises were built. However, 
these enterprises soon proved to be outdated and unprofitable. Economic 
hardship became even more evident when Albania left CMEA and the Warsaw 
Pact in 1968. The situation in agriculture was more or less the same. The 
inexistence of any private-owned land destroyed any labor stimuli of the 
population and resulted in low productivity and subsequent constant shortage 
of even basic foodstuffs.  
  Along with the economy and agriculture Hoxha’s totalitarian regime 
almost destroyed the collective memory and traditions of its people. During his 
rule, that lasted until his death in April 1985, Enver Hoxha exercised an 
outright totalitarian dictatorship based on the cult of the “leader” that has no 
precedents or analogies in the modern history of Europe. In order to achieve 
full control over the population and to unify the people from the North and the 
South into a single state and national identity Hoxha focused his attention on 
eliminating internal differences and political opposites.  
Already during the war Hohxa decided to limit the social and political 
power of the unruly and unsubmissive Ghegs in the North. As in Ottoman 
times, the northern highlanders continued to live in their compact communities 
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according to their traditions and customary laws and were quite unwilling to 
accept the new system and legislative rules. Such traditional society 
represented a serious obstacle in a process of “modernization” and the creation 
of the “New Albania” and the communist leaders decided to approach this 
delicate issue in a drastic way. Instead of a gradual transformation of the 
existing social model they opted for the elimination of the local leaders, so-
called bajraktars, acquainted with the customary laws and guardians of 
traditions and morals. What is more, the northern highlanders were  accused of 
being anti-communist elements who collaborated with Germans and Italians 
and active supporters of the nationalist Balli Kombetar movement. It has been 
reported that in 1944, Albanian partisans were sent to annihilate the tribal 
leaders in the north and that a third of the adult male population was killed on 
that occasion. The bajraktars who survived were killed or imprisoned 
afterwards. Considering these facts it comes as no surprise that in today’s 
Albania local people often have no memories of their own predecessors, of the 
clan or tribe to which they belonged fifty years ago, and that some traditions 
and customs are lost forever.  
   Another thorny issue and a possible threat for national unity was 
represented by religious differences. Although the Albanians through their 
history had showed little attachment to religious issues and are an example of 
peaceful coexistence between Muslims and Christians, these differences had 
always been considered as a possible element of discord that lay in wait. 
During the period of national awakening “the fathers of the nation” tried to 
overcome, or rather to reduce to a minimum this threat with the introduction of 
the doctrine of Albanism. This doctrine which implies that the only religion of 
Albanians is their ethnic belonging was widely accepted by the majority of 
Albanians and examples of religious intolerance are very rare. Yet, these facts 
were not convincing enough for Enver Hoxha and in 1967 he approached the 
issue by banning religion by law. The decree on the atheist state passed and 
three traditional religions were prohibited while the churches and mosques 
were all demolished or transformed into shops or sport halls. There is no doubt 
that this political campaign erased from the collective memories a great part of 
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religious traditions and rites but it should be noted that Albania would not 
easily declared itself the “first atheist state in the world” if the popular sense of 
religious indifference did not have its historical roots.  
  Inherited social, cultural and linguistic differences between Tosks and 
Ghegs were alleviated as we have seen through erasing collective memories 
and traditions but also through complete subjugation of people to the 
Communist ideological stereotypes and clichés. The latest was achieved 
through the final standardization of language and the rapid spread of popular 
literacy which opened wide possibilities for state sponsored communist 
propaganda and the introduction of new national narratives and myths all 
constructed around the figure of Enver Hoxha (the central character was 
Hoxha). According to these myths E.Hoxha was a political genius, brilliant 
military strategist, the infallible founder of the Albanian Communist party, the 
liberator of Tirana, but also the key figure in what is to be understand as a 
modern creation myth – the construction of New Albania. The creation myth is 
a common feature of many cultures. They usually generate in oral tradition and 
are then codified in a written literally tradition.  But in the Albanian case there 
was no single, common creation myth. Hoxha identified this absence and 
created a new framework of national consciousness constructed entirely 
around his figure. Like a hero of classical antiquity he liked to present himself 
as a military genius with the gift of a semi-divine foresight and wisdom and a 
great founder and leader of the nation. In the history of the Party of Albania, 
published in 1982 it was stated that: “Outstanding among all leaders is 
Comrade Enver Hoxha. He is the founder of the Party of Labor of Albania and 
had led it through all historical stages of the revolution. With his wisdom, 
determination, foresight and revolutionary courage, Comrade Enver Hoxha 
has ensured the consistent, revolutionary implementation of the Marxist-Lenin 
line and norms of the Party, has newer allowed it to be diverted into blind 
alleys and has brought it triumphant through all difficult and complicated 
situations… He is the most beloved teacher and leader of the whole Albanian 
people, united in steel like unity around the party and its Central Committee.” 
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  The “new” nation needed a history as well, but this time its purpose was 
not only the creation of social cohesion. History served, above all, to legitimize 
the Albanian leader and his policies, and the selective use of history that 
characterized the early period of Albanian national awakening continued. In 
order to give legitimacy to the Albanian version of communism, Hoxha 
presented himself as the heir of Skanderbeg and presented  the  partisan 
resistance of the Second World War as a natural continuation of the 
Skanderbeg rebellion against the Turks. This manipulation of history gradually 
reached Orwellian dimensions of paranoia.  Contradictory and 
difficult historical fate together with forty years of probably the most ruthless 
dictatorship in Europe had indelible consequences on Albanian society and it 
comes as no surprise that the transitional period and the establishment  of new 
democratic institutions was quite problematic. Unlike many other countries 
from the former Soviet block, which after 1989 returned to their own heritage 
and restore the democratic institutions, Albania, unfortunately did not have 
much to restore. As noted in previous pages Albania in its history did not have 
democratic institutions and traditions, and if any positive heritage of self 
governance had existed, it had been erased from the collective memories 
during the communist regime. What is more, in the transitional period 
Albanians had to face up with a serious identity crisis as well. During 
communism, collective memories, traditions, rites and other important 
elements of Albanian cultural identity were seriously compromised and 
transformed into new values and self-images to which many Albanians, 
willingly or not, adhered. But with the end of Hohxa’s legacy these values and 
self-images were shattered while leaving no alternative unifying national 
vision or what it really mean to be Albanian. 
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The problem of the Albanian national unification 
 
  In 1949 Enver Hoxha left Kosovars to their own fate and during his 
regime the so-called “national question” remained a secondary issue. Every 
now and then the question of Kosovo was pulled out from oblivion  and some 
political and academic works asserted the injustice of the 1913 arrangement 
but it was done only for propaganda purposes when the regime faced 
difficulties of political or economic nature. Contrarily to Serbian convictions 
that Tirana constantly alimented Kosovar discontent and dreams of a Greater 
Albania it was not in Hoxha’s interest to include Kosovo within Albanian 
borders. Both Serbs and Kosovars were not aware of the true nature of the 
regime in Tirana. Those Kosovars who, in a period between 1949 and 1985 
sought shelter in Albania, convinced that the “mother country” would protect 
them, were all handed back to the Yugoslav authorities.  
  After Enver Hoxha’s death in 1985, the ideological differences between 
Yugoslavia and Albania were smoothed out and relations between the states 
improved despite tense ethnic relations in Kosovo. The borders were opened, 
although traveling was not easy due to the introduction of a visa system, and 
the economic and cultural co-operation re-established. The Kosovars and 
Macedonian Albanians who thought that the co-operation between the two 
states would improve their position were wrong, again. In fact, official Tirana 
had much better relations with Belgrade than with Prishtina. Political 
pragmatism and economic interest prevailed and Tirana continued to treat the 
problems of Kosovars as an Yugoslav internal issue. Every now and then state 
officials talked about “equality of rights” for minorities but their commitment 
to Kosovo was only rhetorical.  
  In 1991, “the wind of change” finally reached Albania. The first 
democratic elections were held and the Albanian Labor Party, who had the 
whole power in its hands and full control of the secret services and the army 
won. But, soon the situation in the country became explosive, accompanied 
with a wave of strikes and popular protests and the first government was 
forced to resign. The second elections were held in 1992 and won by Sali 
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Berisha’s Democratic Party.  The new government seemed to be more 
comprehensive toward the Kosovo issue. In fact, a few month before the 
elections Berisha stated that once in power he would bring down the “Balkan 
Wall” and the Kosovars but also Macedonian Albanians began to daydream 
about the tanks which would come rolling over the mountains from Albania to 
defend their brothers as soon as Berisha’s Democratic Party gained power. 
However, the facts that followed proved that Albanians from the former 
Yugoslavia were wrong, once more. Initially, Berisha was seriously convinced 
that Kosovo’s independence proclaimed in Zagreb in 1991, would be 
recognized by the international community, following the examples of 
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a Gheg with many family 
ties with Kosovo he also hoped that the new international situation will finally 
offer the Albanians the chance to unite. He and the Kosovars believed that the 
second elections will be followed by important foreign investments and that 
the Albanian economic situation would improve quickly. This, however, did 
not happen and economically strained Albania could not afford war with the 
Serbs. Considering this situation the Tirana’s official policy on the “national 
issue” became more pragmatic and moderate. Instead of calls for territorial 
unification, which would seriously damage the political and economic 
recovery of the country, official Tirana offered a more realistic solution of the 
spiritual unification, but also because in the words of DP’s vice president 
Shkelzen Maliqi “ a hasty unification now would produce more damage than 
good, because of the large differences in the level of economic development, 
as well as life style, way of thinking and some basic values. The predominant 
view is that the best solution for both Albania and Kosovo is to join the EU”.  
  Strained economic situation and unwillingness of the international 
community to endorse and finance the Albanian dreams of territorial 
unification were not, however, the only obstacle that Berisha’s government and 
Kosovars had to face to. The major opponents were the Albanian citizens who 
soon became indifferent toward Kosovars and their claims and unwilling to 
sacrifice themselves for the “common cause”. Considering this situation the 
Albanian government turned their attention from Kosovo and concentrated on 
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internal issues. In the years that followed  Berisha’s policy toward Kosovo 
often alternate between hardline and moderate positions depending on internal 
situation and Western pressures. Occasionally he used the Kosovo issue and 
played the nationalistic card in order to gain political support of radical 
nationalist and diaspora communities in the US and Western Europe in his 
political struggle with the opposition Socialist Party but in concrete terms did 
little to promote the idea of a pan-Albanian national state.  In 1994, under  
western pressure, Albania recognized the inviolability of Albanian borders 
with Serbia and Montenegro and since then the Berisa’s government has 
pushed for the  idea of an autonomous status for Kosovo within a reconstructed 
Serbia or Rump Yugoslavia. Despite the strong opposition of the radical line, 
which in the meantime gained power within the LDK (Kosovo Democratic 
League) Berisa’s policy continued on this trend until 1997 when the Albanian 
state collapsed due to the failed pyramid schemes.   
  Berisa’s government was succeeded by the Albanian Socialist Party led 
by Fatos Nano who since the very beginning made it clear that the idea of a 
Greater Albania was not on their agenda. Their official position was that the 
Albanian communities should be integrated into different counties where they 
are based and that these liberal and democratic countries would one day join 
the EU and resolve in this way the problem of different Balkan minorities. In 
the 1999 Albanian government gave shelter to 500.000 Kosovar refugees and 
the question of a unitary state was briefly on the table. But after an initial 
“enthusiasm” and a wave of patriotism among the Albanian population from 
the North, alimented by the right wing parties things calmed down. Instead of 
knocking down the existing barriers, the war in Kosovo underlined the existing 
and the new ones arose. In fact, after 1999 the prejudices and negative images 
that the two communities had toward each other increased. With regard to the 
official policy it can be stated that the war did little to change the cold official 
relationships between Tirana and Prishtina.  
NATO intervention in Kosovo led to an escalation of Albanian 
nationalism in the region. In fact, in 2001 there was an armed conflict in 
Macedonia between the governmental forces and the Albanian paramilitary 
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organization and this arose the fear among Albanian neighbors that the 
Albanian national unification may be the next destabilizing factor in the 
region. The response of official Tirana to the events in Macedonia did not 
differ from those issued by the international community. Rather, the state 
officials did their best to reassure Albanian neighbors as well as the 
international community, that the Albanian state does not seek the border 
changes but rather that they hoped the latest would in a future become 
irrelevant and stressed the commitment of Albania to continue the process of 
European and North Atlantic integrations.  
These statements did not, however, convinced the people in neighboring 
countries and many still believe that official Tirana still has the hidden agenda 
and is only declaring what the international community wants to hear. 
However, I believe that the preceding pages and historical facts have shown 
that the official state’s commitment, from King Zogu onwards, to the so-called 
national question was only rhetorical. More a dream of power than a real 
political engagement.  
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The Albanian-Albanian dialogue  
 
In 2005 I carried out the research on identity formation comprising the 
Macedonian and Albanian communities in Kosovo and Macedonia. The main goal 
of that research was to follow the process of the identity formation of the 
“contested” Macedonian identity and to identify how the members of different 
communities, mainly Slavs and Albanians, construct their identities in relation and 
in contrast to each other, to their host states and to the great socio-political changed 
that occurred in the last twenty years. During my fieldwork in Macedonia and 
Kosovo I chose a representative sample of five families with three generations and 
made about fifty interviews with people of different social backgrounds. The sample 
included interviewees from rural villages and urban centers, with elementary, high 
school and university education. 
During the research, quite surprisingly, I discovered that the recent and 
contested Macedonian identity is even less “imaginary” than the Albanian one and 
therefore an interesting subject for further research. The Albanians from the former 
Yugoslavia seriously convinced that there is a static and deeply rooted identity, 
based upon the common language, some ethnic memories and a handful of myths 
would make them one People. However, as a consequence of the interviews 
gathered it appeared that almost a century of living in completely different political 
and social surroundings have created some substantial differences among them. 
When the events made it possible to different Albanian communities to finally get 
closer to each other, the myth that “Albania is not the state of four but the nation of 
seven million people” came under considerable stress. Common language, ethnic 
memories and myths are an important but, I argue, an insufficient elements to create 
a nation and a sense of common belonging.  
In 2007, building on the work of other researchers as well as on personal 
experiences and convictions that collective identities are far from being perennial 
and fixed in some essentialist past but rather subject to continuous mutation, I 
decided to deepen my knowledge on Albanians and their identity formation, and I 
included the Albanians from the Republic of Albania as well.   
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The main goal of this research is to identify how the different Albanian 
communities from Macedonia32, Kosovo and the Republic of Albania relate to each 
other and how they construct their identities in relation or opposition to the official 
state narratives and policies in their home countries. It is my intention to show the 
fluid and ongoing nature of national identities though the narratives of my 
interviewees. I did not focus on the construction of national identities on a large 
scale and as a long term historical process but rather my research was focused on the 
short-term biographical process that takes place over the time of specific individuals.  
The fieldwork on which this research is based was carried out in different 
towns and villages in Western Macedonia and Kosovo as well as in Trieste, where 
the numerous Albanian and Kosovar communities live. The decision to carry out a 
part of this research in Italy was not unintentional. Knowing well the highly 
politicized Balkan environment, where the sense of national belonging seems to be 
an indivisible part of people’s self-understanding and is considered as something 
morally obligatory, I decided to interview people in a neutral foreign territory where, 
once freed from the domestic pressure they would be able report their feelings, 
opinions and personal experiences about so-called “Albania issue” but also about 
their new Italian environment. In order to gain deeper insight into the three 
communities and the complex process of identity formation I partially used the 
results obtained in 2005 combined with fifty new interviews, made in the last two 
years. This time I chose sample that comprised families with two generations and 
used the technique of semi-structured interviews guided through open questions and 
answers. Considering people’s identities too complex and only partially open to self-
inspection and self-description the narratives of my interviewees were solicited by a 
selection of photographs of historical events and personalities as well as symbols 
that I considered as relevant for stimulating life-stories and these are my findings. 
 
 
The Albanians from Macedonia about themselves and the others 
living just across the border.  
                                                
32 It should be noted that, unlike Kosovo, the region in Macedonia inhabited by ethnic Albanians does 
not have a particular ethnonym and in order to distinguish them from other Albanian communities in 
this research they will be always referred as Macedonian Albanians.  
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When, in 2005, I interviewed the members of the Albanian community in 
Macedonia and asked them to give me their personal assessment about their position 
in Macedonian society and in the region as a whole they seemed to be quite 
optimistic with regard to their future and almost filled with enthusiasm and 
convinced of their abilities, tested and confirmed in the crucial moments of  
community existence. It was the period that followed the NATO intervention in 
Kosovo and the armed conflict in Macedonia that drew the attention of the 
international community on the Albanian problem in the former Yugoslavia. 
Although the results of these conflicts were not exactly the expected ones (in 2005 
Kosovo was still under international protection and not an independent state and 
Albanians in Macedonia were not recognized as a constituent people of the 
Republic) in the course of my interactions with a wide range of people of Albanian 
origin I often heard that, in the words of one of my interviewees, ““We (Albanians) 
are strong and capable. Considering that in our bitter history we could never rely 
on state support, we learned to cope with every situation and we became self-
sustainable. Even if the Slavs33 still consider us to be illiterate peasants, in the last 
fifteen years we showed them who we are. Despite strong Macedonian opposition 
we opened an Albanian university in Tetovo, in 1999 we defeated the Serbs in 
Kosovo and finally in 2001 we took to guns to get what belongs to us. “It is really 
sad what occurred in 2001 but” he continues “we simply had no other choice. For 
many years we have looked for our rights but the Slavs did not consider our 
requests. After 1999 and 2001 they learned that they should listen to us”. Such 
positive group self assessment is only partially due to a relatively positive outcome 
of events in 1999 and 2001.  It should be noted that the decades of state-sponsored 
repressive measures, luck of trust in formal institutions as well as historic memories 
of discrimination and alienation held by Macedonian Albanians and Kosovars in 
their compact and economically self-sustainable community.  
                                                
33 In their narratives ethnic Albanians in Macedonia usually do not make distinctions between Serbs 
and Macedonians and refer to them as “Slavs”, a homogeneous mass that share the same 
characteristics (brutal, aggressive and generally bad people who do not treat others as equals but 
instead look down on others and expect Albanians to work in their service) and pursue the same goals 
and that is to overwhelm Albanians and to spread their Orthodox Christian religion at the expense of 
Islam. In fact, the current conflict between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians is often perceived, in 
Samuel Huntington words, also as a “clash of civilizations”.  
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When I asked them to tell me about their personal experiences from the 
recent, socialist past Albanians from Macedonia and Kosovars all reported about 
state repressive measures and their inferior status. The Kosovar told me bitter stories 
about their relatives, who in the 1950s experienced political pressure to declare 
themselves as Turks and were encouraged to emigrate to Turkey. They also told me 
about numerous Kosovars (speaking of about 130.000 people) who were dismissed 
from their jobs after the 1989 riots or about people imprisoned just for being 
Albanians.” During my military service I was accused for irredentism and put in jail 
just because they heard me speaking in Albanian with another Kosovar soldier. We 
were talking about our families but my commander was not convinced. I was 
released after one week”. 
“I worked for 20 years in the same, so-called parallel school in Skopje” said 
a sixty years old woman “and we Albanian teachers, out of respect for our 
Macedonian colleagues, spoke Macedonian in their presence. But the Macedonians 
never learned a single word of Albanian, not even good afternoon. They did not 
consider that necessary, although it would mean a lot to me. We were treated as 
guests in their school although the number of Albanian students was greater than 
the number of Macedonian students. This was really symptomatic and tells a lot 
about our relationships.  
This testimony recalls similar stories I heard in the course of my field work. 
For most Albanians the construction and experience of such events as indicative of 
social exclusion and political repression had created a strong sense of community, 
woven around the idiom of suffering.  
To make things even more complicated the Albanian community is numerous 
and heavily concentrated in Kosovo and in the north-west and south-western part of 
Macedonia and that both regions border Albania. This ethnic continuity, historical 
memories and family ties with Albanians who live just across the border, provide the 
Albanians with a sense of being a part of a great Albanian nation and according to 
many, foment their dreams about Albanian national unification. As one of my 
interviewees, a well known Macedonian political scientist said: “the Albanians can 
be labeled as the teenagers of Europe. If the Macedonians have no other option 
except Europe, Albanians do have, and that is their reunification and than integrating 
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with Europe. They have an intermediate phase, which they would probably like to 
achieve”. This opinion is widely shared by many people in the Balkans. Convinced 
that the Albanians in Macedonia but also Albanians as a whole have a hidden 
agenda they argue that the Albanian ethnic mobilization does not have anything to 
do with claims for greater cultural and collective rights and that their real goal is 
secession form their host states and the creation of Greater Albania. These 
assumptions proved to be mostly true in case of Kosovars but do the Albanians from 
Macedonia have the same aspirations?  
Considering the already tense ethnic relations with the Macedonian Slav 
majority and the lack of support from the international community Albanian 
politicians and intellectuals in Macedonia prefer not to discuss publically the 
“Albanian national issue”. Rather in official discourses they advocate a moderate 
option of Albanian spiritual and non political unification. Concerning this issue, an 
Albanian professor from Tetovo University told me: “It is doubtless that the process 
of the Albanian reunification has already begun and that it can not be stopped. 
However, this reunification has above all, a spiritual and not a political character. 
In 1912, the Albanians were divided by an international border and since then we 
Albanians have lived in different political and social systems. Alongside this in the 
last fifty years we have had almost no contacts and today we can not deny that the 
differences between us are substantial. We Albanians from Macedonia are less 
educated, women are not emancipated and we are far more conservative and 
traditional in comparison with Albanians from Albania and Kosovo.  So the plans 
for unification advocated by some right wing politicians are premature and 
unrealistic”.  
Leaving aside the official and elite discourses, I was interested  above all in 
the feelings and opinions of ordinary people concerning the issue of Albanian 
national unification. As I have already noted in previous chapters, in the second half 
of the 19th century a handful of Albanian intellectuals, mostly living outside the 
country, did their best to “awake and discover the forgotten national identity that 
was sleeping in the deeply hidden parts of the human soul” (Anderson, 1996) and to 
create a sense of common belonging among the conservative, illiterate mountaineers 
of the north and the less fractious Muslims and Christians from the south. Theirs 
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was a difficult task and in order to overcome substantial cultural and religious 
differences the “founding fathers” employed all the means at their disposal. The first 
step in the long process of the Albanian national affirmation was the introduction of 
the Albanian language as a medium of education. Even if important, the linguistic 
element proved to be insufficient in erasing substantial internal differences and 
ensuring the survival of the nation in a difficult Balkan surrounding.  
In order to support national group consolidation, to protect themselves from 
their rapacious neighbors and to justify the claims to the land they inhabit, the 
Albanian intellectuals introduced a series of myths which according to N. Malcom 
can be divided into four major categories: myth of origin and priority, myth of 
ethnic homogeneity and purity, myth of permanent national struggle and myth of 
indifference to religion. These myths which were initially introduced in order to 
eradicate internal differences and to turn the “scattered array of clans into nation” 
were afterwards developed, reinforced and successfully exported abroad, mainly in 
Kosovo and Macedonia. The result of this national building process is that today, the 
Albanians in the Balkans and worldwide are seriously convinced to be the most 
ancient race in southeastern Europe whose origins can be traced back to the ancient 
pre-Hellenic times. Moreover, during my research, I often heard my Albanian 
interviewees quoting the Enver Hoxha’s statement that “Albania is not the state of 
three but the nation of seven million” which in their words originated from 
culturally and genetically pure Illyrian stock. When referring to Albania many 
Macedonian Albanians but also Kosovars often used the metaphor of “the mother” 
who has three children (Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro) which seems to 
suggest that regardless the current situation, Albania (the mother) will never break 
ties with Albanians with its numerous communities abroad . As one of my 
interviewees puts it “We Albanians from Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Albania speak the same language and have the same blood, flag and customs. We 
are one and the same people, are we not34?”  
                                                
34 References to the language and flag are typical of Albanian nationalism. As already noted in 
previous chapters the language is the main marker of the Albanian national identity and the most 
important tie that bands different Albanian communities in the Balkans but also the worldwide. 
Reference to the flag is also very important and gives some substance to the nation. All the Albanian 
families I visited in Kosovo and Macedonia have at least one flag in the house and in many towns and 
villages Albanian flags are displayed everywhere. The reference to common customs is also often 
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All these arguments are put forward in order to justify their political and 
cultural claims in the territories they inhabit but also to give some substance to the 
nation of “seven millions” whose sense of unity came under considerable stress after 
the fall of communism. After almost fifty years of separation and dreams of their 
mother country and compatriots who live just across the border, when the different 
Albanian communities finally met they discovered that there were some substantial 
differences between them and to their big surprise, that they did not like each other 
contrary to their initial expectations.  
Almost all Albanians interviewed in Macedonia have visited Albania at least 
once since the fall of communism and, although grudgingly, most admit that their 
perception about “the mother country” was maybe mythological and imaginary. 
Instead of the cradle of the nation, which they had envisioned for a long time, what 
they found was a backward, poor and dangerous state. A middle aged man from 
Gostivar said: “Believe me when I got there for the first time in the early 1990s I 
cried. For years I listened to my father stories about a fairy tale homeland. But what 
I found was a nightmare. I couldn’t imagine that such poverty could exist in the 
contemporary Europe”. This story echoes other similar stories I heard in the course 
of my interactions with Albanians from former Yugoslavia. An eighty five year old 
man form Struga along with being disappointed with poor economic and general 
conditions of the “homeland” was even rubbed when he went there to visit his 
family that he had not seen since the end of the Second World War. “It was my first” 
and he added “last visit to the homeland”.  
Concerning the people from Albania, often referred as “those from Albania”, 
they also have a poor reputation with Macedonian Albanians and are often referred  
to as smugglers, thieves idlers and, which was quite surprising for me, “non 
believers”. In spite of the fact that in their narratives my interviewees often stated 
that for the Albanians as a whole, religion is not an important issue because “the 
only religion of Albanians is Albanism” and that they tend to portray the weak 
religious sentiment of “those from Albania” as an advantage and indicator of 
emancipation the fact that they criticize the unconventional behavior of other 
                                                                                                                                    
used to give some substance to the nation, although nobody was really able to explain me what these 
customs are.  
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Muslims who drink alcohol and eat pork meat suggests that their adherence to the 
Albanian myth of a weak religious sentiment is only rhetorical.  
 However, regardless of all these facts, Macedonian Albanians are seriously 
convinced that “those from Albania” are advantaged. They had schools and 
universities and, in their opinion an opportunity to develop their national culture and 
emancipate them. On the contrary ethnic Albanians in Macedonia were deprived of 
all this and today they are culturally the most undeveloped Albanian community in 
the Balkans. This cultural backwardness and the widespread phenomenon of 
illiteracy among women were, according to the Albanian political and cultural elite, 
the main reason why the Albanians pushed for the opening of the Albanian 
University in Tetovo. Regardless the strong opposition of the Macedonian 
government and ethnic Macedonians, the University was established in 1994.  The 
very fabric of this university has a very symbolic at meaning, and according to all 
Albanians I interviewed represents the brightest moment in the history of the 
Albanian community in Macedonia. In that building, in 1944, many Albanian 
civilians unjustly accused of collaboration with Italian and German occupational 
forces, were killed, and today, according to the Dean of the University, many young 
people, especially women, are being educated and emancipated there. In the Dean’s 
words “The symbol of Albanian suffering has turned into the symbol of 
emancipation of the entire Albanian community”. 
 I do not deny the importance of the Tetovo University in the process of 
education and emancipation of Albanians, nor do I argue that Albanians in 
Macedonia should be denied the right to higher (university) education in their native 
language, but, I have serious doubts about the purely educational character of that 
institution. Through the establishment of the University of Tetovo (built and mostly 
financed by the Kosovars although ethnic Albanians in Macedonia deny this) the 
foundation for Albanian spiritual unity was set. That is the place where, for the first 
time in history, Albanians from different areas have an opportunity to meet and 
possibly, get closer together. At present, as I realized from the accounts of my young 
Albanian interviewees, this project hasn’t still produced the expected results. When I 
asked him to tell me about his personal experiences with other Albanian 
communities  a 21 years old student from Tetovo said: I’ve been listening since I 
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was a little kid to my father’s stories about Albanian national unity and he was so  
proud that I enrolled at the same university as Albanians and Kosovars. But I share 
neither his opinions nor his enthusiasm. He never had the opportunity to mix with 
Albanians like I did and I can tell you that we’re different. We are less educated and 
more conservative and Albanians treat us with superiority. We have more contact 
with Kosovars but generally Kosovars hang around with other Kosovars, Albanians 
with Albanians and we rarely mix”. 
Another issue that I find scarcely believable concerns the real reasons of the 
Albanian commitment to education and emancipation, especially among women. 
The Albanian society is very traditional and conservative and the women are far 
from being equal to the men. There is also significant discrimination toward female 
children who, especially in rural areas, according to many Macedonians but also 
educated Albanians from urban centers, were and still are, forced to get married at a 
very young age and often denied the right even to elementary school education.  
     These negative trends ware explained by my male interviewees as the 
result of state’s repression and neglect to provide its Albanian citizens with 
elementary and high school education in their native language.  Still, my female 
interviewees told me quite different stories and from their narratives it emerges that 
the Macedonian state is only partially accountable for poor level of education among 
Albanian women. When I asked the wife of an middle aged employee at Tetovo 
University how come she doesn’t speak Croatian despite the fact that she spent 
almost fifteen years in that country, a 35 year old woman replied“ I understand but I 
don’t speak Croatian because I rarely had an opportunity to speak with Croats. I 
and my elder sister grew up there, but we never went to school and we were rarely 
allowed to go out, unlike my brother who speaks your language very well. You know 
he even graduated at the University of Zagreb”.  
The general situation of women in the Albanian traditional society is really 
poor and I often had serious difficulties talking with them and listening to their 
personal opinion about themselves and their community. All my interviews in the 
2005 were made in the Croatian and the Macedonian, languages that my male 
interviewees proved to speak and understand very well, unlike their mothers, wives 
and sometimes even daughters. Unfortunately my problem was not only linguistic 
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but also the conceptual one. When I asked my male interviewees to meet their wives 
and mothers they often answered that talking with them would be a waist of my time 
because in words of my 40 year old and university educated male interviewee “my 
mother and my wife not only do not speak your language but they also have little to 
say about politics and what’s going on out in our society or in the region. You know 
they are housewives and live in their little world”. Unfortunately, from my field 
experience I learned that, in a big number of cases, he was right. Numerous, but 
fortunately not all, male interviewees have almost illiterate mothers, partially 
illiterate wives and until the early 1990s almost all were inclined to withdraw their 
female from schools as soon as they finished their compulsory education (in some 
cases the more conservative and traditional Albanians preferred to pay a heavy fine 
to the state than to send their female children to school).  
Then, starting from the early 1990s the things changed significantly and I 
could not escape a general impression that today young Albanian women in 
Macedonia are more than encouraged I would say almost obliged to continue with 
their higher education. As reported by a 19 years old Albanian girl from Tetovo “It 
was not my intention to continue to study after high school but my father really 
insisted. He’s an activist of the Albanian Democratic Party (right wing) and he 
thinks that we Albanian girls should go to the university and learn foreign 
languages and become like women in Albania. So I enrolled at the faculty of 
economic. You know, he keeps talking about importance of education and 
emancipation but in the evening I’m not allowed to go out, to wear short skirts like 
Albanian girls or to have a boyfriend. We are supposed to study, to find good jobs 
and earn money but also to maintain our traditionally subordinate position in the 
family.  
Form the above discussion there seems to be enough evidence to state that 
the poor level of education among Albanian women in Macedonia is only partially 
due to the state’s policies and I argue that this negative trend can be also ascribed to 
the internal restriction that Albanian traditional and conservative community 
imposed on its members. I also argue that the desire to change and emancipate their 
community is not exclusively the outcome of a long process that matured within the 
community. Rather, I would say that it was imposed from the outside and was a part 
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of political platform which aimed to remove the existing, cultural, political and 
social, obstacles on the path towards an Albanian, first spiritual and than political 
unification.  
Albanians in Macedonia rioted in the past as well and rightly claimed for 
more cultural and group rights, but it was only at the beginning of the 1990s that 
their demands became more aggressive. In the 1990, they organized demonstrations 
in which participants demanded the foundation of a Greater Albanian state. The next 
year, an overwhelming majority of Albanians boycotted the Macedonian referendum 
on independence and organized their own referendum which resulted in the 
proclamation of the Republic of Ilirida, an autonomous Albanian political entity. In 
the same period Albanian politicians began to claim for more rights and these claims 
ranged from guarantees of cultural rights to the elevation of the Albanian 
community to a status of constituent nation of the Republic of Macedonia. In 1994 
they opened the University of Tetovo and began to use the Albanian flag in public 
life (Albanians in official discourses argue that the red flag with the black eagle is 
not the symbol of the Albanian state but the symbol of the Albanian people 
worldwide). In other words they began to challenge the Macedonian’s exclusive 
right to the state. In the meantime Tetovo, since the early 1990s a small provincial 
town developed into probably the biggest Albanian cultural centre in the Balkans, 
with its two Albanian universities as well as numerous bars, restaurants and night 
clubs. In these, until yesterday exclusive male domains, alcohol is regularly served 
and it is not uncommon to see young women. Although all these great political, 
social and cultural changes were welcomed by the majority of my interviewees, I 
could not escape the impression that rather then welcomed these changes are only 
tolerated, because, as many pointed out“we are culturally, socially and politically 
the most backward Albanian community and if we are to become like others 
(referred to other Albanians) we have to accept these changes. If those from Albania 
drink alcohol we will serve it in the bars. If their women go to schools and 
universities and study foreign languages our girls should follow their example. 
Another big problem of our community is the attachment to religion. We are much 
more religious if compared to Albanians and Kosovars and it is something we have 
to overcome”.  
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In these, I argue, not exactly, spontaneous and “genuine”, processes of 
political awakening and affirmation as well as in the cultural emancipation of 
Albanians in Macedonia, Kosovars had a decisive role. Unlike “those from Albania” 
who in the narratives of Macedonian Albanians are portrayed as parasites, 
communists and betrayers of the “common cause”, when asked about Kosovo and 
its inhabitants, the perceptions and feelings of my interviewees were quite different. 
Many Albanians from Macedonia whom I met, have close relations with Kosovo 
and almost all tend to identify themselves more with Kosovo and Prishtina than with 
Albania and Tirana. Such attitudes are understandable considering that the two 
communities were not separate by the state border and that many Albanians from 
Macedonia studied and even married in Kosovo. Kosovo is also an important 
political ally and almost all my interviewees reported that they can rely more on 
Prishtina than on Tirana to solve their problems with the Macedonian state.  
In their interactions with foreigners, ethnic Albanians in Macedonia when 
referring to Albanian community from the former Yugoslavia usually use the term 
of “us” which implies that there are no differences between them and that they and 
Kosovars are, as many of my interviewees reported, “like one body and soul”. In 
their narratives the sense of unity and solidarity with Kosovars was constantly 
asserted and after a while they almost convinced me. 
 It should be noted that in the Balkans the people of not Albanian extraction 
tend to portray the Albanians as a “compact”, “conservative” and “impenetrable” 
homogeneous mass where all members think, feal and act as one. They are also 
considered to unwilling to admit any external influence and it is widely assumed that 
they can not be studied, because even if the Albanians accept to be interviewed they 
will not be truthful or forthcoming and only provide information imposed from 
above. I must admit that at first sight they seemed to be as Macedonians and Serbs 
describe them, but after some time, as I socialized and I talked with them, that I 
realized that there are many differences among them and their opinions and feeling 
about their own community’s past and present, about Kosovo and possible national 
unification are not that unitary as they would like to present it. Rather there are very 
real and actual divisions among them. So I discovered that not all Albanians feel a 
strong attachment to the Albanian flag and Albanian nation, not all think that they 
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and Kosovars are one body and a soul or that they should sacrifice themselves for 
Kosovo, and that regardless their sometimes very categorical statements they are not 
particularly anxious about changing borders.  
When I showed him the image of the Albanian flag, a middle aged Albanian 
man said: “Please turn off the recorder and promise you won’t cite my name in your 
dissertation. If my Albanians hear what I have to say about the flag I would end up 
in trouble. I would be a target. I never comment on political issues in the company 
of other Albanians. It has been a long time since I have felt so free to speak my mind 
about the whole situation. Well, I’ll tell you. I do not give a damn about the flag. To 
me, it is important that my country (referred to Macedonia) provides me with 
normal life and living standards. If they provide me with that I don’t give a damn 
about the flag and national unification. “ 
With regards to his community and their relations with Kosovo an Albanian 
employee from the Tetovo University said: “You probably had hard times with my 
Albanians here in Macedonia. They all told you the same story, didn’t they? That’s 
because in our community an individual and his personal opinions and feelings are 
not important. The community is important. With regards to Kosovo I’ll tell you 
what the people in Tetovo think but never say it out loud. We do have the same blood 
and we speak the same language but there had always been a border between us, 
ever since the Turkish era. During the Socialist Yugoslavia as well we lived in two 
different political realities. Regardless their claims and discourses between 1971 
and 1989 they were an autonomous province and had a wide range of cultural and 
political rights. Of course it was not enough because being considered only a 
national minority was really humiliating. But they had a university, schools, 
newspapers and the television. All things we could only dream about. What’s more 
they all lived on state support while we were forced to immigrate. They consider us 
illiterate peasants and use us every now and then for their political goals, but you’ll 
see that once they become independent they will mind only their own business and 
leave us to our own fate”.  
This statement surprised me, but five years later it seems that my interviewee 
was right.  
 
 86 
 
Kosovars about themselves and the others, living just across the 
border 
 
In 2005, when I met and interviewed the members of the Kosovar 
community, they seemed, just like their Macedonian neighbors, filled with 
enthusiasm and convinced in their abilities. Once they defeated the Serbian army (it 
is the widespread opinion among Kosovars that was them and not the NATO forces 
who defeated the Serbian army) and finally resolved the problem of Serbian 
oppression they were quite optimistic about their future. Of course their political 
status, at that time, was still uncertain and this caused some anxieties among local 
population but, from their narratives I understood that the option of returning under 
the direct Serbian jurisdiction was scarcely believed possible. In the prospect of the 
creation of the independent Kosovar state I was interested in investigating people’s 
opinions and perceptions about their future status but also about their immediate 
Balkan surrounding. Like Albanians in Macedonia, Kosovars as well were shown 
photographs representing important events from the community’s past and present 
as well as powerful symbols like flags and monuments and these are my findings.  
Unlike their Albanian neighbors from Macedonia, Kosovars were less 
hospitable and quite unwilling to discuss about their community. I was rarely 
allowed to enter the houses and I must admit, that the quite short interviews were 
almost always made in the bars or on the door-steps. While in Macedonia I felt free 
to go wherever I wanted and I spoke with people freely it was not so in Kosovo.  
Regardless of the recommendations and suggestions of my ethnic 
Macedonian friend that it is really dangerous to walk around alone in the areas 
where the majority of the population was Albanian I never had bad experiences. On 
the contrary, I remember that I used to go alone in bars and restaurants (quite  an 
uncommon habit for a woman in that part of the Balkans) and to order coffee or a 
meal in my really poor Albanian. Although it was clear that I’m Slavic they’ve 
never been rude to me. On excusing myself for my poor Albanian, they usually 
answered with a smile and remarked (in Macedonian) “never mind we know that 
Albanian is difficult but we really appreciate your attempt to say at least good 
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afternoon in our language. Now you can speak your language we can understand 
you”. 
When I told to my Albanian friends in Macedonia that was my intention to 
visit Kosovo some of them were really worried. “You must be crazy” remarked a 
middle aged ethnic Albanian politician when I told him about my intentions, “I’m a 
man and Albanian but I never go to Kosovo alone. Prishtina is a dangerous place 
imagine what can happen in the villages and small towns”. On my remark that I’m 
not afraid and that as a Croat (Kosovars doesn’t perceive as  enemies) I probably 
will not have problems he answered “you do not speak Albanian and I’m afraid that 
as you open your mouth in five seconds they won’t understand the slight linguistic 
differences between Serbian and Croatian and that they can shoot you” 
Regardless these recommendations I decided to visit Kosovo and to make 
few interviews with local people. I was always in the company of other Albanians 
(mostly my friends from Macedonia) who previously arranged all interviews and 
explained who I was and what kind of research I was caring out. Although 
unwillingly Kosovars answered the major part of my questions. I asked my 
questions in Croatian and the majority of my interviewees answered in Albanian 
(their answers were kindly translated by my Albanian friends from Macedonia) 
because as one of my middle aged interviewees pointed out “I can understand you 
perfectly, I can even speak Serbian but I do not want to answer in that language. 
Now Kosovo is free and I hope we won’t hear that language never again.  
All my Kosovar interviewees were asked to report their feelings about their 
life in the former state and if they ever felt to be a part of the Yugoslav federation. 
The majority told me more or less the same stories about that period. They all told 
me, I must say, quite confused stories about the unequal status of Albanians in the 
former state and I was not able to understand what the real reason of their discontent 
was. On my remark that their was a de facto republican status which granted them 
all cultural and group rights they all replied that it was not enough. I also asked them 
if the real goal of the 1981 demonstrations was the secession from the Yugoslav 
state and their answers tended to be vague and repetitive. The majority reported that 
the former state was a “dungeon of the Albanian nation” dominated by the Slav 
majority but they also reported, when shown the images of the Olympic Games held 
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in Sarajevo in 1984, sometimes with a smile on their face that they were really proud 
that such an important international event was held in “their” country. I could report 
pages and pages of such, for me confusing testimonies but I decided to cite only one, 
which in my opinion summarizes in a few sentences the real reasons of Albanian 
discontent. Regarding this issue, a middle aged university educated man from 
Prishtina said:  You ask me to tell you about my feelings and perceptions regarding 
the Yugoslav period. On your question I’ll answer with another question. If in the 
former state there was such a  thing as “brotherhood and unity” how come you do 
not speak my language but I speak yours? I had to learn the Serbian language and 
to be honest that did not disturb me when I was a young man. I was born in a family 
of intellectuals, communists and we did not consider ourselves as nationalists. Of 
course at home we spoke only Albanian and I knew that we were different but it was 
only at the university that I learned who I was. Considering that the University of 
Prishtina had a really bed reputation of being the worst university in the former 
Yugoslavia my father sent me to Belgrade to take a “real” degree in political 
sciences. My family was not rich and I had to work to earn my living during my 
studies, but as an Albanian the only work I was offered was the wood logging. 
Regardless all my efforts I and also other Albanian,s were not able to reverse our  
low social status. It was a Slav centered state and in your eyes an Albanian remains 
Albanian regardless everything.  That’s why we rioted in 1968, 1981 and in 1989. I 
participated in the 1981 demonstrations and I was arrested for irredentist activities. 
I spent 16 months in jail and it was in that period that I began to dream about my 
“real homeland”. 
The stories about the “homeland” I heard in Kosovo echoed the similar 
stories I’ve already heard in Macedonia. But, while the majority of my Macedonian 
interviewees made only short trips to Albania, the Kosovars, I would say 
unfortunately, had the opportunity to deepen their knowledge about that country. In 
fact, in 1999 when the war in Kosovo broke out many Kosovars found shelter in the 
neighboring Albania. It was on that occasion that many of my interviewees learned 
that the homeland of their dreams, hopes and aspirations doesn’t exist and that the 
Albanians living across the border are more “cousins” than “brothers”, with whom 
they had little in common.  
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In 2005 these perceptions had never been openly declared by my Kosovar 
interviewees. In their narratives it was always categorically asserted that the 
Albanians in Albania and Kosovo are one and the same people. They all pointed out 
that the Albanians on both sides of the border share the same blood, customs and 
traditions, common historical memories and language and that all these attributes are 
sufficient to allow them to consider themselves as the members of the same nation. 
If there were some differences between them they all tended to minimize them (this 
was particularly referred to the language) and portray them as simple regional 
particularities or as the result of a long period of separation. All these differences 
and possible obstacles were, according to their narratives easily surmountable.  
These perceptions are understandable if we consider that until very recent 
times Kosovars did not have an alternative to their self-definition and identification. 
As already noted in the previous chapters the foundation of the Albanian 
independent state preceded the creation of the Albanian nation and the “founding 
fathers” had worked hard to overcome significant internal differences and to create 
and divulge the sense of common belonging among its citizens. Regardless of all the 
difficulties the Albanians from the motherland managed to develop perhaps a 
primitive but solid national culture. In the same period Kosovars became unwanted 
guests and subjects of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and were not 
included in the process of the Albanian nation building. Discriminated even in their 
basic human and civil rights they were not able to advance politically or culturally. 
During the Second World War different Albanian communities had experienced a 
period of national unification under the auspices of the fascist Italy. After the 
Second World War there was also a short period of collaboration between official 
Tirana and Belgrade that enabled contacts among Albanians from Kosovo, Albania 
and Western Macedonia. Still this short period of time was not sufficient to allow 
different Albanian communities to deepen their knowledge about each other. The 
great split between Tito and Stalin and Enver Hoxha’s decision to ally his country 
with Moscow against Belgrade radically changed this political situation. In fact, 
from 1948 to the late 1990s, the border between Kosovo and Albania remained 
hermetically sealed. The obvious result of this division was the creation of two 
different Albanian cultures and I argue of two different nations. The four decades of 
 90 
the isolationist regime of Enver Hoxha destroyed many aspects of traditional 
Albanian culture while the population, according to the groups’ own assessment, 
lived in ignorance, fear and misery. In material terms they were deprived of all but 
the bare essential needs to stay alive. On the other side Kosovars had quite a 
different story. Unlike their Albanian cousins, they made some economic progress 
and achieved a certain degree of prosperity. During the period of Socialist 
Yugoslavia they were citizens of a powerful state and enjoyed relative freedom and 
privileges which their Albanian “cousins” could only have dreamed of. Still, 
according to the narratives of my Kosovar interviewees, the former federation failed 
to create a common state for all its citizens and they had never considered 
themselves as Yugoslavs. On the contrary, they all reported about social exclusion 
and political repression which resulted into complete withdrawal of the Kosovar 
community. Hermetically closed and traditional they found the exit solution in a 
constant assertion of their Albanian identity, based on memories, undoubted ethnic 
and linguistic similarities but also myths, and their dreams about a fairy tale 
homeland.  
Unfortunately, when the two communities finally met in 1998, Kosovars 
learned that the reality was completely different. Not only were they strongly 
disappointed with poor economic conditions of the state but above all with its 
inhabitants. However, while the state was portrayed as poor and without effective 
state organization and political stalemate the disillusion with its inhabitants has 
never been openly declared, at least not in Kosovo. On my demand to tell me about 
their feelings and perceptions about Albanians from the homeland Kosovars tended 
to give me vague and in my opinion not entirely genuine answers. Some of my 
interviewees reported that they perceived “some” cultural differences and that 
meting with Albanians from the homeland did not entirely fulfill their expectations 
but they were quite unwilling to give me further explanations. Some of them said a 
few words about “Fatos Nano’s treacherous government” and about Southern 
Albanians who are “selling the state to Greeks and Italians” but the unity of the 
Albanian nation has never been questioned in their narratives. Unlike Albanians 
from Macedonia my Kosovar interviewees did not portray their Albanian cousins as 
idlers, thieves and “non-believers” but rather as a “little bit lazy” and “completely 
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destroyed by communism”. “They do not have working habits” said a 35 year old 
man from the village near the Albanian border. “I spent six months in Albania as a 
refugee. We lived in a village which did not offer much entertainment and we had a 
lot of free time, so me and my cousins decided to fix the road near to the house 
where we lived. While we were working the locals were sitting on the edge of the 
road and making jokes about us saying that we were crazy to work for free. That’s 
not our business they used to say. It is the state who should take care about ruined 
roads and building. Which state I was wondering? There is no state in Albania and 
as long as they do not learn to rely on their own forces they won’t change their poor 
situation. We Kosovars are different; we are much more determined and have more 
initiative.  
The cultural differences between Albanians and Kosovars, according to my 
Kosovar interviewees, are mostly based on different perceptions of the state and its 
governance (which is quite understandable if we consider that the two communities 
lived in completely different political systems) but are, in their opinion, easily 
surmountable. Any further attempts to deepen my knowledge about possible 
perceived cultural differences between Kosovars and Albanians resulted in their 
refusal to give me answers or in efforts to change the subject. “Listen, do not ask me 
about cultural differences between us and Albanians” said a middle aged man from 
a village near the Macedonia border, “they are not important and even if there are 
some differences now we feell that we are getting closer and closer to the Albanian 
people in Albania”.  
In this process of cultural rapprochement the language issue has a very 
important role.  Whenever I asked my Kosovar interviewees to explain the linguistic 
differences between Kosovars and Albanians they all recounted that the language 
they learned in school is the same as the language spoken in Albania and that 
“slight” dialectal differences do not prevent them to understand each other. This 
supposition was not entirely true. Kosovars and Albanians do understand each other 
but the language used in Kosovo is based on the Gheg dialect and differs from the 
language that is taught in school and used in Albania. The Albanian official 
language, used in formal interactions and public life, so-called Letrare is 
predominantly based on the Tosk dialect of Southern Albania.  
 92 
Although the overwhelming majority of Kosovars do not speak that language 
the Letrare was recently introduced as a first language in all TV stations and 
newspapers and employees from Albania proof read and corrected the language that 
the Kosovars produced. Some of my interviewees also admitted that for them it is 
really difficult to speak in that way but it seems that the desire to get closer to the 
Albanians and their culture at any price is stronger than their desire to preserve their 
own characteristics. The language issue was something very delicate to discuss with 
Kosovars and any observation about their “regional peculiarities” was taken as an 
attack on the “National Issue” because as they put it “We are Albanians and we have 
to learn our language properly and correctly”.  
Another delicate issue I wanted to tackle with my Kosovar interlocutors was 
the possible existence of a separate Kosovar ethnic and national identity. My 
questions about the Kosovar identity were not to be understood as provocative nor 
was it my intention to deny or question the existence of the Albanian unified 
national sentiment, as because I also share Miller’s point of view that “national 
identities are constructed by belief and nationality exists when its members believe it 
does”. I simply asked, in a prospective of a future foundation of the Kosovar 
independent state, if this event could possibly promote the creation of the new 
Kosovar identity. I also argued that the new state will have to choose new state 
symbols and will have to create a state identity. In reply to my questions, Kosovars 
were quite categorical in asserting that a separate Kosovar ethnic or national identity 
doesn’t exist. “It’s a myth invented by Serbs in order to undermine our national 
sentiment. There is no Kosovar identity nor will such a thing ever exist”. Regarding  
the flag an overwhelming majority of Kosovars replied that the only flag they could 
recognize as their national symbol is the already existing red and black Albanian 
flag with its two-headed eagle. To my remark that that flag is the symbol of the 
Albanian state, they replied that is not true, for that flag is the symbol of the entire 
nation and that the international community will have to accommodate their claims 
to use it as a state symbol as well.   
 In 2005 I did not spend much time in Kosovo and I did not have an 
opportunity to deepen my knowledge about its inhabitants. It was in Italy, especially 
through my job as a consultant on immigration issues that I got in close contact with 
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this community and its various problems. This time, free of the burden and bulk of 
their history and from their Balkan environment they showed more willingness to 
tell me about their community but also about their personal feelings and 
experiences. While in Kosovo I perceived them as a conservative and hermetically 
closed community where it was almost impossible to hear an individuals’ point of 
view, in Italy different views emerged through their narratives.  
 When I asked him to tell me his perceptions about Albanians a 45 year old 
Kosovar said” When the war started I left my burning house and I and my family 
found  shelter in Northern Albania. We did not have relatives there so I had to find 
the accommodation for my wife and children. I was quite surprised with their living 
conditions but what really shocked me were the people and their behavior. They 
were convinced that we Kosovars are rich. Well in the past that was perhaps true 
but in 1999 we were fleeing from  war and misery and Albanians used that situation. 
In 1999 they did not treat us like their compatriots but rather, we became objects for 
their self-enrichment. The man who rented me a room in his house asked for an 
exorbitant price for the roof and food. Fortunately I had a brother in Germany who 
sent me the money. Otherwise, I’m convinced that he would have showen us the 
door. When the war ended we immediately returned home and we never went back 
there. Oh, if you do not trust me I can bring you other Kosovars who will tell you the 
same story”.  
Fortunately not all Kosovars had such dramatic experiences. Still those who 
visited Albania finally admitted that in 1999 the forced reunion was a cultural shock 
for the Kosovar community. They recounted about the horrible living conditions, the 
misery and lawlessness of the Albanian state but they also reported, in the words of 
my 35 year old interviewee from Prishtina “At the beginning when I meeting them 
(Albanians) for the first time I found out that we were similar, but as time passed I 
noticed differences. I do not know how to explain this to you. Yes, we have the same 
identity because we speak the same language (although he admitted that there are 
some differences) and the same traditions but after a while I had the impression, 
that they belong to another nation”. 
 For others it was not only the impression. “I was raised to think that I’m 
Albanian and that we and they are one and the same people. In our family we used 
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to watch Albanian TV and to listen to their radio stations (although this was a very 
dangerous activity after the 1981 riots) and consequently we were seriously 
convinced that Albania was the country of our dreams. We thought that was a happy 
and independent country where free people raised their own flag. When I arrived 
there for the first time in 1993 (he arrived in Albania from Italy by ship because the 
border between Serbia and Kosovo was de facto closed) the first thing I did was to 
kiss the holy Albanian ground. However the great disappointment arrived soon. The 
problem was not the poverty or misery of the country, but the people. They did not 
show any comprehension for the problems of Kosovar Albanians or any interest for 
the “Common cause”. In 1993 I was told that I was not an Albanian but a Kosovar. 
This stunned me; I did not expect such betrayal from my compatriots”.   
In the course of my research I heard also other testimonies in which the 
Albanians from the homeland were referred to  as “ill-mannered”, “primitive”, 
“crime-ridden”, “egoistic”, “presumptuous” people “who looked down on us as we 
were just illiterate peasants”. Such stereotypes and prejudices without doubt 
seriously affected relationships between Kosovars and Albanians, but from their 
narratives it clearly emerged that the major cause of Kosovar disappointment is the 
scarce commitment or rather indifference of Albanians to the so-called “National 
Issue”. 
In 2008 Kosovo finally declared its independence and today it is a state with 
its own symbols, recognized by the US and 22 out of 27 members of the European 
Union. At this point I was curious to find out if the feelings of my Kosovar 
interviewees about a possible emergence of the new Kosovar ethnic/national identity 
had changed since 2005.  
Despite the fact that Kosovars sometimes embark on virulent stories and 
describe the “others” in the light of negative stereotypes, the majority is still 
convinced of being a part of a “great” and “unitary” Albanian nation. With some 
rare exceptions the overwhelming majority of my interviewees reported that they 
consider themselves as Albanians with Kosovar passports.  
“The stories about separate Kosovar identity makes me laugh” stated a 29 
year old woman from Mitrovica, “You are asking me what this new Kosovar flag 
means to me? Well I can not say absolutely anything because it is the result of our 
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long fight against the foreign oppressor but I do not perceive it as our national 
symbol. This symbol does not disturb me but I do not recognize myself in it. I was 
born an Albanian and I can not become something else just because the 
international community decided so.  
Feelings and perceptions of other Kosovars do not differ much regarding this 
delicate issue. They are all convinced that they are one of the most ancient races in 
Europe that had never lost its national self awareness. A population who had fought 
for centuries against different foreign oppressors and had been unjustly divided in 
1912. After almost hundred a years they are convinced that this great injustice will 
be somehow readjusted. Kosovo today is an independent state and they are very 
proud about this. Still, many consider this new political reality only as an 
intermediate phase and that the natural outcome of a century old struggle will be the 
final reunification with other Albanians. Differences, cultural and their own opinions 
of the world, between them and Albanians do exist but many consider them just skin 
deep, based on prejudice and anyway surmountable. 
 Such strong nationalistic feelings are understandable and can be explained 
as a form of self-defense against oppressive rule. What is more it is not something 
that sprouted in the last twenty years but has been going on for almost a century and 
I do not think it can be easily erased. Still. Hope is often last to die. In the last few 
years the issue of a separate Kosovar identity became an object of public debate and 
some intellectuals started to promote this more civil form of identification. They 
argue that different histories have created two distinct identities and even if the 
Kosovar identity is still in an embryonic phase and perhaps unstable, they argue that 
this identity exists but has to be supported. The first efforts in this sense were made 
in the early 1990s when Ibrahim Rugova, the Kosovar Gandhi, tried to promote the 
idea of the Kosovar national cuisine or the introduction of a new flag with a symbol 
of the ancient Dardania (the ancient word for Kosovo and ancient kingdom of 
uncertain origins). The opposition to these ideas very strong. The same thing 
happened in 2008 when the first Kosovar Prime Minister Agim Ceku argued that 
Kosovo has to find its own place on the Balkan geopolitical map and make its own 
secular nation. In response, the nationalists accused him of betrayal.  
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Although the idea of a separate Kosovar identity is still a taboo and strongly 
opposed among its citizens, I truly believe that this will change. The new state has 
been established, with its new symbols and borders (which can not be changed 
according to the agreement on inviolability of the Kosovar borders signed in 2007, 
one of the main conditions for international recognition) and like all other states 
worldwide the Kosovar as well, will have to the achieve the necessary level of 
social, national and cultural cohesion. This will be done through state institutions 
and the education system. Of course this will not be enough, so they will need some 
history and new national myths. Through the inevitable process of state building in a 
few decades I believe that they will learn who they are. Like we all did in the 19th 
and 20th century. Moreover I argue that the necessity to stress ethnic ties with the 
“homeland" will significantly diminish now that the external threat (Serbian 
oppression) has disappeared.  
The last, but not least important, thing is that to create a union between two 
territories there must be a consensus on both sides of the border. According to the 
data I gathered through the interviews with my Albanian interviewees this consensus 
is missing, as far as they are concerned.   
The issue of national identity always has the capacity of provoking debates 
and inflaming spirits. Especially among Kosovars and Macedonian Albanians who 
are, I would say, obsessed with the issues relating to their national and ethnic 
identity. Here in Italy, however, these issues seem to be less important. The national 
identity issue is discussed in bars, with compatriots and people like me. But what 
really worries my Kosovar informants is not the “National Issue” but the hard 
economic crisis that the region has undergone in the last decades and they all 
referred to a deterioration of the economic conditions, high unemployment rates and 
almost a complete isolation of the country. For this situation they blame the Serbs 
and their oppression, bloody wars in the Balkans but also their own politicians, who 
incompetent and corrupt haven’t a clue how they should lead their country. At 
present they do not see the way out of this situation and many Kosovars have 
decided to emigrate. When I asked them to tell me about their experiences as 
migrants and if they feel integrated in this community their general assessment 
tended to be positive but as a young Kosovar women pointed out “I do not have 
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problems here but I do knot now if I really like it here or if I’m integrated in this 
community. I simply do not have time to think about those things and who cares if I 
like to stay here or not. I have to stay here and work. At home I have parents and 6 
brothers and sisters who survive only thanks to me and the money I send there every 
month”. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Albanians about themselves and the “others 
When I told to a 35 year old man from Durres that I was writing my PhD 
dissertation about Albanians he immediately accepted to be interviewed and showed 
his disposability to tell me about his feeling and personal experiences regarding his  
community. But, when he found out that my research includes also other Albanians 
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and that I wanted to hear his opinion about the “Albanian national issue” he replied  
“I thought we will talk about us (shqipetar) not about them (Kosovars). You know, 
we Albanians from the South already have enough problems with our” domestic 
northerners” and we really do not need further complications .We Albanians from 
the south, speak different dialect in our every day speech and we are better educated 
and highly cultured.  We are also much more open to the world. Those from the 
north are different. You know, they are backward and conservative people who still 
live in the clans and according to the principles of the common law and practice 
vendetta, like in the Turkish times. The Kosovars are similar to our northerners but 
maybe even more violent, arrogant and crime-ridden. As far as I know they were 
fine in Yugoslavia. They had plenty of food, could own property, their houses are 
three times as big as ours and they had possibility to emigrate to the West, if they 
wish. If you ask me they fought for flag! To my remark that many Kosovars, as well 
as international organizations, have reported about severe violations of even basic 
human rights in that region during the regime of Slobodan Milosevic and that in 
1999 there was a war and that many Kosovars were expelled he replied:”Yes I know 
that. Many Kosovars arrived in Albania in that period and they caused only 
troubles. They argued that they were oppressed. Well, I have my own, personal 
theory about that issue. Maybe I’m wrong but I’ll tell you what I think. Like other 
northerners, Kosovars as well, have been living, since time immemorial in their 
backward parallel societies and admit no foreign influence. They like nobody but 
themselves and simply cannot live with others. As expected when I asked him about 
the “Albanian national issue” he replied: “We southerners do not consider it as an 
“issue”. The Greater Albania doesn’t exist. It’s just a myth invented by “those” 
from the north.  
 This statement recalls similar, although less virulent statements I often heard 
in the course of my interactions with Tosks. In their narratives Kosovars were 
portrayed as liars, Mafiosi, inhospitable and only interested in money making, but 
also fascists collaborators. “They (Kosovars) are talking about patriotism but I can 
tell you that they were the only Albanians who welcomed Germans in the Second 
World War and are responsible, together with their Ministers for the worst 
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atrocities against Albanian population in Albanian proper. We did not forget that!” 
said an older man from a village near Vlore.  
All these opinions are clearly indicative of the feeble sense of community 
with Kosovars but they also revealed a deep divide that characterizes the 
contemporary Albanian society. In their narratives they often make distinction 
between shqipetar (Albanians from Albania) and Kosovars and then than quickly 
pass from the category of Kosovar to that of “northerners”.  
The rivalry between two basic ethnographic groups is well known and 
originated way back in the Albanian history. During Hoxha’s regime the cultural, 
economic and linguistic differences between these two groups were attenuated with 
quite repressive policies and many interviewees reported that during the communism 
everything was mixed up and it became almost impossible to talk about differences 
between these two groups. The Ghegs from the north adopted the Tosk dialect and 
abandoned their clan structure which was an important step forward in the process 
of national homogenization. But when the communist system fell apart the old 
rivalries and traditions reappeared. This was particularly accentuated in the political 
life of the country. During the Sali Berisha’s leadership the Tosks were almost 
excluded from the political life and the key positions in the new government were 
given to Ghegs. This new political situation caused a strong resentment among 
Tosks. In 1997, overthrown after almost five decades of undisputed governance 
(Enver Hoxha’s government was predominantly Tosk) Tosks organized riots after 
the collapse of Berisha’s pyramid schemes and almost let the country to the brink of 
civil war.  
 The problem between Ghegs and Tosks is not only political but also cultural. 
Many southern Albanians reported that after the end of communist ideology same 
nasty habits and traditions arose from the historical ashes. Probably due to the fact 
that the state is weak and its institutions do not function the Ghegs revived 
application of the common law and tradition of vendetta. It is hard to get 
information about this phenomenon, but it is known that in the last twenty years in 
northern Albania hundreds of people were killed and that many had to leave the 
country to avoid blood feud. This practice is not applied in the southern Albania. 
“While we (southerners) are talking and dreaming about Europe our compatriots in 
 100 
the north are shooting each other and continue to live in primitive communities. We 
will never join the EU with that people. And you know what? As far as I’m concern 
they can secede from Albania and join Kosovo. They are more or less the same 
people” said a young university student who spent the major part of his life in 
Trieste.   
 This statement surprised me but I’m absolutely sure that the young man did 
not really mean that the north should secede form the south. The perceived 
differences between Albanian north and south are real but, the territorial and 
national unity of the Albanian state are not in danger. I also argue that intolerance 
toward Kosovars is mainly based on stereotypes and prejudices. Many southern 
Albanians I interviewed in the last two years admitted that they did not have much 
direct contacts with Kosovars. In 1999 the overwhelming majority of Kosovars 
found shelter in the poorest regions in the north and very few people went to south. 
Here in Italy Albanians and Kosovars live separate lives and rarely mix up together. 
I’m not saying that they have no contacts but according to my interviewees they can 
rarely be defined as friends. 
Unlike southern Albanians who showed little solidarity and understanding 
for problems of Kosovars their northern compatriots were less categorical about this 
issue. Whenever I asked my northern Albanian interviewees if there were any 
differences among them and Albanians from Kosovo and Macedonia their first 
reaction was identical to those I’ve already heard in Kosovo and Macedonia. “No! 
We are of same flash and blood. We have the same language and customs. We are 
brothers”. Yet from their narratives emerged some contradictions. When I asked my 
young Albanian interviewee from Kruje if she had contacts with Kosovars and to 
tell me her opinion about them she recounted me her personal experience. “Yes of 
course she said. I have relatives in Kosovo and we met for the first time in 1999. 
Until then we did not have any contacts and I even ignored their existence. I was 
glad that we met because the family in Albania is very important. Yet, since the very 
beginning I noticed some differences above all in mentality but also in language. My 
cousins are Muslims while we are Orthodox Christians. Usually in Albania this is 
not the problem. We have a lot of mixed marriages and nobody cares if one is 
Muslim or Christian because we all have same more or less habits and customs and 
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our way of life doesn’t differ much. But those gays were real Muslims. They did not 
eat pork meat, and this was a great problem because we do. It’s the cheapest meat 
and we couldn’t afford beef. They were really disturbed with this. Yet, they did not 
want to share expenses and in six months they did not give us even a penny. I also 
remember that they did not drink alcohol and that they observed five Muslim prays 
every day. I found that practice so weird. I mean I respect the religion but that was 
really strange. Our Muslims are not that strict. We are family, same flash and blood 
but I found them different. I do not how to explain you this but I had impression that 
they belong to another nation. When the war finished they left and we do not have 
contacts with them. This however was not my only experience with Kosovars. I had a 
friend in Trieste as well. She was my work colleague but she was also strange. 
Closed, just like my cousins. I know she had problems at home. You know they all 
live together. The whole family in the same house. Can you imagine? She, her 
husband, their children and then her brothers in law but also her husband’s parents. 
If I were her I would run away!  
Regarding the issue of the Albanian national unification the same woman 
said: “No I do not think that we should unite. We are too different. Maybe one day. I 
do not know. To be honest I never considered that option. We Albanians already 
have a lot of our internal problems and I do not think that would be a good solution. 
Maybe one day the process of European integrations will bring us together. 
Yet, not all my interviewees had the same opinion. Some of my interviewees 
stated that they consider Kosovo, Western Macedonia and some parts of Greece as 
an integral part of an Albanian motherland. A young woman proudly declared that 
all Albanians should first unite in a common state and only afterwards join the 
European Union. “We and Kosovars are the same people, divided by the Great 
Powers hundred years ago and I believe that the time has come to correct that great 
historical injustice. Our brothers suffered so much during the Serbian regime. I 
heard some horrible stories about what happened in Kosovo and I was really 
shocked. I heard about the girl from Kosovo who was raped in front of her mother 
and her house was burned. I really think that we should help them”. To my remark 
that the war is over and that Kosovars today do not need arms but rather that the 
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realization of a Greater Albania would require serious political commitment, strong 
public support and significant sacrifice she did not seemed that convinced any more.  
“Well I really think that we should unite but the people are selfish and they only 
mind their own business. I do not think that my compatriots are willing to give up all 
our achievements (she was referring to the fact that Albania one year ago joined the 
NATO and that few months ago EU decided to abolish the visa system for Albanian 
citizens) or to endure more suffering for national cause”.  
 Her father, for example, was one of those people. Fifty eight year old man 
form Shkoder stated that as far as he is concern the national unification is not an 
interesting subject of discussion. “Do not pay attention to my daughters’ statements. 
She was too young when the war started and she saw all those refugees. That 
impressed her. I remember well that period. We did not host any Kosovars in our 
house but the town was fool. The newspapers were full of news from Kosovo and we 
were shocked by the stories of refugees. It was the first time that we seriously took 
into consideration the possibility that Kosovars maybe have serious problems with 
Serbs. Until 1999 we considered them a normal Diaspora community who had much 
more possibilities and opportunities than we did. For us Kosovars were rich and 
lucky people. Then we heard their stories and that woke up some nationalist 
sentiments. I remember our corrupted politicians who spoke of the unity of the 
Albanian nation and of solidarity with Kosovars. There were also demonstrations in 
support of Kosovars but this nationalistic enthusiasm did not last long, maybe few 
months. Then we returned to our domestic issues and concerns. With regard to 
Kosovars I think that we are all Albanians but I do not think that we should unite. 
For me it’s important that they are not oppressed any more. I can not tell more 
about this argument because I do not have Kosovar friends and I do not follow what 
is going on there. To be honest I do not follow the political situation in Albania 
either. Now we live here and have other problems”.  
 I’ve also heard other testimonies, some even very “radical. I remember a 
young man from Peshkopi, a small town near borders with Kosovo and Macedonia, 
who stated that he would be ready to die for the idea of a “Greater Albania”. 
“Please do not use the expression Greater Albania. That expression has 
expansionistic connotations and I do not like it. I prefer to speak of “ethnic 
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Albania”. We Albanians are ten millions and we like other European peoples have 
right to live together in the same state. Greeks, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians 
stole our lands and if today we are poor that’s because we were divided and our 
neighbors took the best part of our territories. If we were ten millions we would have 
been the most important political factor in the region”! When I asked him if he was 
ready to fight for that idea and go to war he was not so sure that he would enlist as a 
volunteer. “Well I did not really mean that I was ready to die in a literal sense. But 
yes, I support that idea. I was convinced that Americans and Europeans have finally 
understood our problems and that they would help. Politically and economically. 
But they did not. Unfortunately here in Albania we have incapable and corrupted 
politicians (Generally speaking there is a great distrust among Albanians toward 
politics and politicians who are often regarded as dishonest liars who pursue their 
personal goals and do not care about the country and its population. They also 
believe that they move in vicious circle where sometimes wins North – Berisha’s 
Democratic Party and sometimes South – Albanian Socialist Party but both are 
incapable to improve the situation in Albania). The only one who could lead such 
project are Kosovars. They have sense for business and more political initiative then 
we do”! To my remark that regardless their “sense for business” and great political 
initiative Kosovo today is the poorest region in the Europe with the highest 
unemployment rate (according to some statistics about sixty percent) he answered: 
“Well I did not mean that we will join in a common state now. Now we (Albanians) 
have higher living standards than in the past but we still can not afford such 
ambitious project. Kosovars first have to rebuild their economy and to straighten 
their institutions and than we will see”.  
 Despite the fact that some of my interviewees declared that they and 
Kosovars should unite (it is important to notice that in their narratives they rarely 
mention Albanians from Macedonia) and had openly declared their adherence to the 
idea of Greater Albania I believe that their nationalism is nevertheless limited. They 
are ready to dream of national unity but without being personally involved or ready 
to sacrifice themselves for the “common cause”. As they see it, it would be really 
nice to be a part of the state of ten million inhabitants! but somebody else should 
take care of that project. Maybe the Albanian state, or Kosovars or maybe even EU, 
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they are not sure about that. In the mean time they live their every day existence 
peacefully and are very much concerned how to earn their living, find the house, 
sent their children to school, renew their documents or bring their parents, wives and 
children in Italy.  
 With regard to the delicate problem of integration the general judgment of 
my Albanian interviewees is that their community is well integrated in the local 
community. The middle aged generation is quite satisfied with their living standards 
and although they sometimes highly educated they accept low paid and sometimes 
inadequate jobs for their level of education. “In Albania I was a high school teacher 
and here I work as a simple blue collar but I do not suffer about that. It’s normal. 
We are immigrants. I did not expect that here I’ll find an adequate job or that this 
state will recognize my university degree. I’m fine here. I live much better that in 
Albania and what is important I believe that my children here will have better 
opportunities than in their homeland”.  
 The younger generation told me similar stories. Many young Albanians 
arrived in Italy with their families when they were children. Here they took the high 
school diplomas and many have decided to continue with their university 
educations. Their Italian is often almost perfect. They grow up here and have Italian 
friends and fiancés. But when it comes to find the job they believe that they have 
fewer opportunities than Italians of same age. Often the jobs they are offered do not 
meet their expectations.  
“After I graduated at the faculty of economics the only job I found was in a fast food 
restaurant. I accepted because it was the only way to convert my permit of stay and 
to stay here. Yet, I can not imagine that I will be doing this job for long. It’s 
frustrating. I was also considered to go back home. You know with Italian degree I 
could find better job but after a while I abandoned that idea. I’ve been living here 
since 2002 and this is my home. I do not have friends in Albania, I do not have 
anything there. Albania should be my homeland but I’ll be honest. When I go there I 
feel little bit like a foreigner. I grow up here and the people in Albania have 
different mentality. I really do not know what to do”.  
 This story echoes similar stories I heard in the course of my research and I 
believe that such perceptions are very possible source of future social conflicts here 
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in Italy. However, these perceptions are not limited only to the Albanian community 
but are widespread among young immigrants, regardless of their nationality. The 
first generation of immigrants generally accepts their lower social status but I’m not 
sure that we can state the same thing also for the second generation. I also argue that 
the problem of young immigrants can not be reduced to a simple problem of social 
status and includes the identity field as well.  In the course of their existence all 
immigrants inevitably experience some sort of identity crisis. This would be a very 
interesting subject for further studies.  
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 Conclusions  
 
The main aim of this research was to gain deeper knowledge about so-called 
“Albanian Question”. Through numerous interviews with members of Albanian, 
Kosovar and Macedonian/Albanian communities I tried to investigated the reasons 
and possible further developments of this phenomenon. I was also interested in 
showing the instable and ongoing nature of national identities. Building on a vast 
literature and previous works of scholars like Hall, Paff, Biling and other theorist of 
nationalism and identity creation, I argued that, the group identities are far from 
being fixed forever in some essentialist past but rather subjects to continuous play of 
history and power. (Hall, 1996) 
In second chapter, in order to support this argument I described the history of 
the identity formation of three major Albanian communities in the Balkans from the 
Turkish era to the present times. I also investigated the main characteristics and 
some problematic aspects of Albanian nationalism. 
 Like many other peoples in the Balkans, Albanians as well like to present 
themselves as ancient and continuous inheritors of long and honorable pedigree. 
However the historical sources clearly indicate that in the past this identity was not 
well defined and expressed. Like other subjects of the Port, Albanians as well 
considered themselves and were considered by others, as members of different 
clans, Turks or simply Christians. Due to the serious external and internal obstacles 
the rise of national and patriotic ideas in Albania came late. The Albanian “founding 
fathers” had a very difficult task in transforming scattered array of clans into nation 
and in order to achieve this goal they used all means at their disposal. The Albanians 
had distinctive language, traditions and some ethnic memories but these elements 
proved to be insufficient in erasing internal differences and ensuring the survival of 
the nation in Balkan surrounding. In order to support the national consolidation and 
to justify the claims to the land they inhabit they introduced a series of myths. These 
myths were afterward developed, transformed almost in a religious belief and 
successfully exported abroad, mainly in Kosovo and Macedonia. The final outcome 
of this nation building process is that today Albania is not the state of three but an 
“imagined community” of seven or maybe even ten million people. 
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Seduced by a nationalist ideologies, but also I would say, strongly influenced 
by the hostile surrounding, Kosovars and Albanians from Macedonia have lived for 
decades with a strong belief of being a part of the great Albanian nation. But when 
the events made it possible to different Albanian communities to finally get closer to 
each other, they discovered to their great surprise, that they do not know each other 
and that the differences among them are substantial. Instead of a fairy tale homeland  
“where free people raise their own flag” what they found when they went there for a 
first time was a poor and backward country whose inhabitants are often depicted in 
the light of negative stereotypes. In the narratives of my Kosovar and Macedonian 
interviewees the Albanians from the homeland are often referred as “ill-mannered”, 
“crime ridden”, “presumptuous” and “egoists” who in the last twenty years showed 
scarce commitment to the so-called “National Issue”  
In spite of everything, the overwhelming majority of my interviewees from 
Kosovo and Macedonia reported that they still consider themselves as a part of a 
“unitary” Albanian nation who had been unjustly divided in 1912. If there are some 
differences, they argue that they are just skin deep and anyway surmountable. In the 
last fifteen years the two major Albanian Diaspora communities made a significant 
effort in order to approach the cultural standards of Albanians form the homeland. In 
this process the language issue has a very important role. Regardless the fact that the 
Albanian official language based on the Tosk dialect, so-called Letrare has never 
been used in Kosovo and that the overwhelming majority of Kosovars do not feel 
very comfortable with that language the Letrare was recently introduced in formal 
interactions and public life. On the other hand religious and conservative Albanians 
in Macedonia were strongly encouraged to break the structure of their traditional 
society currently involved in a very dynamic process of modernization and 
emancipation. Yet, these efforts did not give the expected results because at present 
the sense of community does not cross the border.  
Considering this situation I wanted to tackle with my Kosovar interviewees a 
delicate issue of a separate Kosovar ethnic/national identity. Recently this argument 
has become an object of public debates but any my observation about their “regional 
peculiarities” caused a strong resentment and was taken as an attack on their 
national sentiment.  Although the idea of a separate Kosovar identity is still a taboo 
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and strongly opposed among its citizens, I truly believe that this will change. The 
new state has been established, with its new symbols and borders and like all other 
states worldwide the Kosovar as well, will have to the achieve the necessary level of 
social, national and cultural cohesion. This will be done through state institutions 
and the education system. Of course this will not be enough, so they will need some 
history and new national myths. Through the inevitable process of state building in a 
few decades I believe that they will learn who they are. Like we all did in the 19th 
and 20th century. Moreover I argue that the necessity to stress ethnic ties with the 
“homeland" will significantly diminish now that the external threat (Serbian 
oppression) has disappeared. The last, but not least important, thing is that to create 
a union between two territories there must be a consensus on both sides of the 
border.  
In the narratives of my southern Albanian interviewees Kosovars were 
portrayed as “violent” and “intransigent mountain people who caused nothing but 
trouble while the question of national unification was not considered as an 
interesting object for further discussions. Unlike southern Albanians who showed 
little solidarity and understanding for problems of Kosovars their northern 
compatriots were less categorical about this issue. Whenever I asked my northern 
Albanian interviewees if there were any differences among them and Albanians 
from Kosovo and Macedonia their first reaction was identical to those I’ve already 
heard in Kosovo and Macedonia. “No! We are of same flash and blood. We have the 
same language and customs. We are brothers”. Yet from their narratives emerged 
some contradictions and closer examination revealed that their commitment to the 
so-called national issue is only rhetorical. 
  
 However the Albanians from Albania and Kosovars are not the only people 
in the Balkans concerned about their identity. In the new political situation 
Albanians form Macedonia feel excluded from both Albanian nations. Although this 
group has a great potential for ethno-political mobilization and many ethnic 
Macedonians fear their secession I argue that their Albanian compatriots will not 
seek an extreme “exit” solution. This is not because their nationalism is less 
aggressive but simply because the Albanians from Macedonia have no other choice. 
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The mother Albania definitely abandoned her “children” and Kosovar state is too 
week for such ambitious project.  
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